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ABSTRACT
Algorithms for Large-Scale Internet Measurements. (December 2010)
Derek Anthony Leonard, B.A., Hendrix College
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Dmitri Loguinov
As the Internet has grown in size and importance to society, it has become
increasingly difficult to generate global metrics of interest that can be used to verify
proposed algorithms or monitor performance. This dissertation tackles the problem
by proposing several novel algorithms designed to perform Internet-wide measure-
ments using existing or inexpensive resources.
We initially address distance estimation in the Internet, which is used by many
distributed applications. We propose a new end-to-end measurement framework
called Turbo King (T-King) that uses the existing DNS infrastructure and, when
compared to its predecessor King, obtains delay samples without bias in the presence
of distant authoritative servers and forwarders, consumes half the bandwidth, and
reduces the impact on caches at remote servers by several orders of magnitude.
Motivated by recent interest in the literature and our need to find remote DNS
nameservers, we next address Internet-wide service discovery by developing IRLscan-
ner, whose main design objectives have been to maximize politeness at remote net-
works, allow scanning rates that achieve coverage of the Internet in minutes/hours
(rather than weeks/months), and significantly reduce administrator complaints. Us-
ing IRLscanner and 24-hour scan durations, we perform 20 Internet-wide experi-
ments using 6 different protocols (i.e., DNS, HTTP, SMTP, EPMAP, ICMP and UDP
ECHO). We analyze the feedback generated and suggest novel approaches for reduc-
ing the amount of blowback during similar studies, which should enable researchers
to collect valuable experimental data in the future with significantly fewer hurdles.
iv
We finally turn our attention to Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS), which are
often tasked with detecting scans and preventing them; however, it is currently un-
known how likely an IDS is to detect a given Internet-wide scan pattern and whether
there exist sufficiently fast stealth techniques that can remain virtually undetectable
at large-scale. To address these questions, we propose a novel model for the window-
expiration rules of popular IDS tools (i.e., Snort and Bro), derive the probability that
existing scan patterns (i.e., uniform and sequential) are detected by each of these
tools, and prove the existence of stealth-optimal patterns.
vTo my family
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1CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
1.1. Overview
The Internet and the services it supports have grown in importance both econom-
ically and socially in the last decades. However, with this growth the Internet has
become more difficult to manage and improve due to the sheer number of end-hosts
[35],[37],[42] and networks [92], the presence of malicious entities constantly seeking
to exploit users [68], [70], [97], and a general inability to deploy global changes caused
by its decentralized administration [72], [81], [102]. Given these issues, it has be-
come increasingly difficult to perform Internet-wide experiments that are critical to
verifying newly proposed algorithms (e.g., [20], [24]), tracking growth and changes
in the Internet population (e.g., [10], [34]), and monitoring global metrics of interest
(e.g., [35], [81]). In this dissertation we tackle the problem by proposing several novel
algorithms for performing Internet-wide measurements of various types and studying
their impact on remote networks. We next highlight some of the goals we developed
to inform the design of each of the proposed techniques.
As the purpose of Internet measurements is to produce useful data, our first over-
arching goal is to design algorithms that allow for experiments to be performed in a
timely fashion (i.e., days or weeks instead of months) using fairly inexpensive local
hardware, which ensures that progress can be accomplished quickly and makes our
methods accessible to a larger number of researchers. To ensure this is the case, we
The journal model is IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking.
2do not consider any solution that requires modifying existing protocols or deploying
servers at remote locations, which can be prohibitively expensive and extremely dif-
ficult logistically. Our second goal is to design algorithms that minimize the impact
on remote users and networks while still acquiring the data of interest in a timely
fashion. This generally takes the form of reducing bandwidth consumption at remote
networks and minimizing disk space and CPU cycles for their servers and end-hosts.
Further care must be used to avoid sending large bursts of traffic to individual net-
works, which can congest routers and effectively cause a denial-of-service for remote
users. In short, we are interested in developing algorithms that allow for efficient col-
lection of data without requiring extensive local resources or overburdening remote
networks and their users.
With these goals in mind, the next three chapters in this dissertation present
algorithms with the ability to perform Internet-wide measurements and analyze their
effect on remote networks. The rest of this chapter briefly introduces each of the
topics in turn and describes how they relate to form a unified dissertation.
1.2. Turbo King
We start with distance estimation in the Internet, which has recently become a large
field of study [7], [16], [20], [24], [28], [32], [33], [49], [54], [60], [75], [76], [80], [87],
[98], [99], [109], [111], [118], [126]. Estimates or measurements of latency between
end-hosts can be used to improve the efficiency of networks (e.g., content distribution
networks) and service to end-users (e.g., reduce user-perceived latency or improve
responsiveness in online games). Existing techniques largely consist of virtual coor-
dinate approaches that estimate delay [20], [24], [33], [36], [49], [60], [76], [98], [99],
[111], which are limited by a lack of real-world distance data for verification, and
3methods that employ tracers to measure delay [1], [28], [72], [81], [102], which are
inherently limited by the difficulty of deploying measurement servers throughout the
Internet. Our aim is to bridge this gap by proposing a framework that allows for
accurate latency measurements on an Internet-wide scale without modifying existing
protocols or requiring large-scale deployment of remote sensors.
A natural choice for this endeavor is King [32], which approximates the distance
between end-hosts using the delay between Domain Name System (DNS) servers re-
sponsible for mapping human-readable names to IP addresses of the hosts in question.
However, through an evaluation of King we show that it suffers from non-negligible
estimation bias, inundates remote servers with unnecessary requests (i.e., pollutes
message caches), and incurs significant network overhead that makes it unsuitable for
Internet-wide measurements. We attempt to mitigate these drawbacks by developing
a new system called Turbo King (T-King) that improves on the accuracy of King,
effectively eliminates cache pollution at remote servers, and significantly decreases
network traffic by minimizing the number of queries needed to make distance mea-
surements using DNS. Turbo King starts with a large set of DNS servers collected
from throughout the Internet, from which is taken the closest nameserver to each
end-host for use in the measurement. Once the closest nameservers are selected, T-
King then uses a new measurement algorithm which not only reduces the number of
queries and bandwidth overhead of King by more than 50%, but also achieves higher
accuracy and a factor of N reduction in the number of polluted cache entries at each
remote server for an N ×N latency measurement.
We finish the chapter by evaluating both the prevalence and the effect of bias
incurred by King, then describing a method for building the database of DNS servers
required by Turbo King. To quantify the effect of bias in King, we use a small
50× 50 delay matrix and compare the estimates produced by King to those of Turbo
4King. Our results show that 15% of the measurements are different by more than
10% and 8% by more than 20%, which indicates that the severity of bias in King is
non-negligible though generally mild. We then build the database of DNS servers for
T-King by crawling the reverse DNS tree and discover a set of 216, 843 nameservers,
out of which we find 117, 817 to be recursive and receptive to queries originating from
our subnet. These servers reside in 174 countries, cover over 31, 000 BGP prefixes, and
are responsible for approximately 50% of IP addresses (i.e., 828 million) advertised
in BGP [92]. However, the technique of reverse-crawling the DNS tree discovers only
authoritative nameservers, which omits nearly all of the local DNS servers that are
not part of the DNS tree but are often responsible for performing recursive queries.
Our desire to locate these servers motivated us to search for a new discovery method,
which led to the work described next.
1.3. IRLscanner
A more comprehensive technique for discovering remote hosts is horizontal scanning
[107], which is a method for enumerating (in some set S) all remote hosts that support
a given protocol/service p. This is accomplished by sending packets to destinations
in S and counting positive responses within some time interval. Besides discovering
DNS servers for Turbo King, such a technique has wide applicability and can also be
used to study publicly available services in the Internet (e.g., end-hosts [35], [37],[42],
web sites [10], [34], [52]), understand how botnets are created by Internet worms [17],
[45], [62], [108], and evaluate the prevalence of known security flaws (e.g., DNS [25],
SSH [82]).
Though several Internet-wide service discovery measurements have been pre-
sented in the literature [10], [25], [35], [83], they have been largely focused on ob-
5taining data in some finite amount of time (often months) rather than designing
a high-performance scanner or maximizing politeness at remote networks. In accor-
dance with the high-level goals we set for the algorithms developed in this dissertation,
we maintain three objectives for a good Internet-wide scanning solution. The first
requires efficient usage of local resources, which will ensure that the implementation
supports scan durations T on the order of hours or even minutes. The second ob-
jective is to provide accurate extrapolation of interesting metrics when partial scans,
which are often useful when only the number of hosts is desired instead of their actual
IPs, are performed. The last objective is to maximize politeness at remote networks,
which is accomplished by reducing the burstiness (i.e., instantaneous load of traffic)
sent to target subnets. This serves the dual purpose of avoiding overload for inter-
mediate routers and lowering incidents of wasted investigation effort, false alarms by
Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS), and general administrator annoyance.
After initially showing that previous work does not satisfy our objectives, the
second part of the chapter presents our design of IRLscanner, which is a high-
performance and source-IP scalable framework for service discovery in the Internet.
We show that achieving optimal politeness at remote networks requires a novel algo-
rithm for controlling the order in which IPs are targeted (i.e., a permutation) as well
as an algorithm for parceling targets to local scanning nodes (i.e., a split). The result-
ing techniques space probes to each CIDR subnet s evenly throughout scan duration
[0, T ], even with multiple source IPs. The permutation is also designed to provide
accurate extrapolations using partial scans, which is exhibited by the 1% estimation
error in the number of live hosts IRLscanner incurs after only a 10 second scan (at
a sending rate that would cover the Internet in T = 24 hours). Finally, the goal of
allowing for arbitrarily fast scan durations leads us to several optimizations that help
achieve our objectives. We show that the scope of measurements (i.e., the number of
6IP addresses scanned) can be decreased significantly over that of previous scanners
without significantly affecting results, that retransmissions are largely ineffective and
can be omitted, and that by using much larger timeouts for unresponsive targets we
can capture a wider array of busy/slow hosts in the Internet than was possible before.
Using IRLscanner, in the third part of the chapter we perform 20 Internet-wide
scans that run over 20 times faster than any prior scanner, span three protocols,
and encompass several ports such as DNS (port 53), HTTP (port 80), SMTP (port
25), EPMAP (port 135), and UDP ECHO (port 7). We perform several experiments
that have never been attempted in the literature on an Internet-wide scale, including
targeting several novel ports (i.e., ECHO, EPMAP, SMTP), using different types of
packets (e.g., ACK scanning), and performing the first large-scale OS fingerprinting
study of 44M web servers that respond to port 80. We finish the chapter by presenting
the feedback received during our experiments in an effort to inform others of what
to expect when performing similar studies. Included are a detailed analysis of email
complaints, techniques for using firewall log correlation data to understand the impact
of individual measurements on IDS detection in the Internet, advice for predicting the
potential number of complaints when scanning a particular port, and other methods
for reducing the perceived maliciousness of scans. In the next section we extend our
analysis of the impact of scanning on remote networks in a more formal manner by
focusing on IDS and modeling detection rates in light of various scan patterns.
1.4. Modeling Window-based IDS and Stealth Scanning
One of the difficulties of understanding the impact of horizontal scanning on remote
networks is a lack of information about what administrators consider to be harmful
traffic. Fortunately, as the number of malicious entities in the Internet has grown over
7time [78], [108], many networks now use Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) to monitor
traffic and detect various forms of potentially malicious activity, including horizontal
scanning that we employ with IRLscanner. When an IDS detects unwanted traffic,
it can cooperate with firewalls to block offending hosts and alert administrators of
the actions taken. To formally analyze horizontal scanning, we model two popular
IDS implementations (i.e., Snort [105] and Bro [12]), study their ability to detect
existing techniques [3], [41], [59], [62], [82], [83], [108], demonstrate that more stealthy
algorithms can be used to scan faster than previous methods while avoiding detection,
and suggest modifications to current IDS that mitigate such algorithms.
While there are several algorithms that can be used by IDS to detect scanning
once past history has been established [43], [95], [113], most existing IDS tools [12],
[44], [74], [84], [105] keep per-flow statistics only for a limited period of time to estab-
lish this history, which is called window-based processing of traffic. Given the large
quantity of data commercial IDS must process, this maintains scalability [56] and
ensures that state will not grow to infinity. To avoid a large number of false positives,
IDS also typically require for a configurable number of packets, called a threshold, to
be received during a particular window before raising an alarm or initiating estimators
such as TRW [43]. Given the purely regenerative [89] nature of window-based pro-
cessing and the need to exceed the threshold, it then becomes possible for a scanner
to avoid detection simply by staying beneath the threshold throughout each window.
However, it is unclear how well current methods avoiding tripping IDS and whether
there are better techniques, which we tackle next.
We start by developing two models for window expiration based on deployed IDS
solutions [12], [44], [74], [84], [105]. The first we call IDS-A, which is based on Snort
[105] and expires the state of all scanning sources every ∆s time units for subnet
s. The second we call IDS-B, which is based on Bro [12] and expires state for each
8individual source i ∆s time units after the last target hit by i. IDS-B selectively
tracks sources that continuously scan and never expires their state, which allows IDS-
B to perform much better than IDS-A at detecting slow scanners. We then analyze
existing scan patterns in light of these IDS models and develop optimal strategies for
avoiding detection.
To aid our analysis, the key metric we introduce is stealth cover time (SCT),
which is the minimum scan duration T that allows a particular Internet-wide scan
pattern X (i.e., permutation, split, and schedule of time instances when packets are
sent) to avoid detection at s. Using SCT, we then define a scanner to be stealth-
optimal (SO) if it simultaneously minimizes the SCT of all CIDR subnets under both
IDS-A/B. We then show that SO patterns exist, define their properties, and derive
their SCT in relation to IDS-A/B so that existing scan patterns (i.e., IP-sequential
[108] and uniform [62], [82], [83], [108]) can be analyzed for their stealth ability. After
deriving the probability that both IDS-A/B detect each scan pattern, we derive their
respective SCT’s and show that the uniform permutation is generally much stealthier
than IP-sequential. However, contrary to common belief [3], [41], [59], we demonstrate
that in some cases IP-sequential is stealthier than uniform against IDS-A (i.e., in all
networks larger than /20) and against IDS-B (i.e., in those larger than /21). As
expected, IDS-B is significantly harder to avoid than IDS-A, and both permutations
require a constant-factor slower scanning as a result. Most significantly, in comparison
to SO patterns we show that the uniform permutation is orders of magnitude slower
under all practical conditions and SO patterns cover both IDS-A/B with the same
SCT. For example, using /16 subnets and default Bro settings, SO scanning has an
SCT that is 1, 209 times smaller than uniform, which results in a reduction in scan
duration T from 3.3 years to 1 day without increasing the probability of detection.
The next part of the chapter deals with implementing the stealth-optimal pat-
9	
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Fig. 1. Organization of this dissertation.
terns derived previously and testing them in the Internet. In practice, SO patterns
can be achieved using the same permutation and split proposed for IRLscanner, but
in order to achieve stealth-optimality against IDS-B a new schedule is required to al-
low for variable sending rates. In fact, the algorithm used in IRLscanner is a special
SO case called unaware with an SCT that is slower against IDS-B than IDS-A. Using
IRLscanner and the newly designed algorithm that is stealth-optimal against both
IDS-A/B, we run three Internet-wide HTTP (port 80) scans using T = 24 hours and
monitor the resulting number of scanning reports generated at the SANS Internet
Storm Center (ISC) [94]. We demonstrate a nearly 40% reduction in reports from SO
scanning over the original unaware IRLscanner, which implies that IDS-B is being
actively used by IDS in the Internet. Our testing also allows us to determine the
optimal parameters for minimizing the number of ISC scan reports, which agree with
our analysis and confirm the proposed models. To round out the chapter, we propose
a new model of scan detection called IDS-C that dynamically increases ∆s with every
packet received and results in significantly reduced effectiveness of SO scan patterns.
The rest of the dissertation is organized as illustrated in Fig. 1. In Chapter
II we present the Turbo King framework for distance estimation in the Internet.
Chapter III contains our design of the IRLscanner Internet-wide service discovery tool
10
and subsequent experiments, then Chapter IV tackles modeling Intrusion Detection
Systems and the existence of stealth-optimal scan patterns. We finish with Chapter
V, which summarizes the dissertation and discusses future work.
11
CHAPTER II
TURBO KING
2.1. Introduction
Widespread interest in distance estimation in the Internet has recently evolved into
a large field [7], [16], [20], [24], [28], [32], [33], [49], [54], [60], [75], [76], [80], [87],
[98], [99], [109], [111], [118], [126]. The purpose of this research is to estimate or
measure the latency between hosts, which can then be leveraged to provide better
service to end-users and construct more efficient networks. Examples include in-
creasing the responsiveness of online games, efficiently locating the closest server in a
content distribution network, and building topologically-aware P2P networks. While
the existing approaches are promising, obtaining a large-scale1 Internet distance map
for verification of virtual-coordinate approaches [20], [24], [33], [36], [49], [60], [76],
[98], [99], [111] and actual use in deployed applications has proven to be a difficult
task. The aim of this chapter is to introduce a first step in this direction and propose
a framework that allows such a service to be transparently enabled in the current
Internet.
Due to the difficulty of deploying tracers [1], [28], [72], [81], [102] in every possible
network, we choose to build upon an existing technique called King [32] that does
not require any changes to existing protocols or access to remote computers. King
approximates the distance between end-hosts using the delay between DNS servers
1The scale considered in this chapter assumes building an all-to-all delay matrix
between approximately 220, 000 BGP prefixes advertised in the Internet. This is in
contrast to the frequently-used latency maps today [24], [61], [76], [126] that rely on
100− 400 nodes in PlanetLab or 1700− 2500 nodes in the DNS tree.
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authoritative for IP addresses of the hosts in question. While generally accepted as a
sound methodology for estimating delay and used in many papers [5], [6], [15], [21],
[23], [24], [29], [53], [57], [86], [88], [91], [96], [109], [118], [124], King has not been
analyzed for accuracy and pitfalls since the original paper [32], nor has it been involved
in measurements larger than 2500× 2500 nodes. Furthermore, some of the advanced
techniques suggested in [32] have never been implemented and their feasibility in
practice has not been assessed in the literature.
We start the chapter by identifying causes of King’s inaccuracy and evaluating
its suitability for large-scale measurements. We first argue that King incorrectly es-
timates delay when the target DNS zone contains multiple nameservers that are not
geographically close to each other (e.g., outside the target domain and its BGP net-
work). We also find that King can estimate entirely wrong delays when the source
DNS zone uses forwarders, which are stand-alone servers that aggregate queries from
multiple domains. In such cases, King fails to detect the presence and location of for-
warders, in addition to incorrectly measuring the forwarder’s query-processing delay
that must be subtracted from the final measurement. In regard to overhead, King
utilizes a complex multi-step process (see below for the algorithm) that requires nu-
merous queries for each delay measurement and seeding of source DNS servers with
a large number of unwanted entries. As the scale of the experiment increases, cache
pollution becomes a non-trivial issue.
To overcome these drawbacks, we propose a new system called Turbo King (T-
King) that streamlines the process of making distance measurements using DNS,
improves their accuracy, reduces overhead, and almost entirely eliminates cache pol-
lution. The first component of T-King is a large collection of nameservers distributed
throughout the Internet, from which the closest nameserver to each end-host A is
selected for use in the measurement. In the current implementation, we use periodic
13
crawls of the DNS tree to find nameservers that can be used in the measurement
and maintain this information in our server. The second component of T-King is
a new measurement algorithm based on several improvements we have made to the
advanced techniques in [32] that mitigate problems caused by forwarders and zones
with multiple authoritative nameservers. Our approach not only reduces the number
of queries and bandwidth overhead of King by more than 50%, but also achieves
higher accuracy and a factor of N reduction in the number of polluted cache entries
at each remote server for an N ×N latency measurement.
We finish the chapter by showing how to build the current database of DNS
servers in Turbo King, examining how likely King is to experience its drawbacks in
practice, and assessing the effect of these drawbacks on King’s delay estimation. We
first perform a reverse DNS crawl to discover a set of 216, 843 nameservers, out of
which we find 117, 817 to be recursive and accepting queries from outside networks.2
These servers reside in 174 countries, cover over 31, 000 BGP prefixes, and are re-
sponsible for approximately 50% of IP addresses (i.e., 828 million) advertised in BGP
[92]. Further analyzing the data, we find that 33% of reverse DNS zones utilize a
nameserver that neither belongs to the same BGP prefix nor the same domain as the
other servers. Additionally, over 32% of recursive servers found in this study use a
hidden forwarder, which suggests that a large fraction of King’s measurements may
be affected by the drawbacks identified in this work. We finish the chapter by quan-
tifying the effect of this bias using a small 50 × 50 delay matrix and comparing the
estimates of King to those of Turbo King. Our results show that 15% of the mea-
surements are different by more than 10% and 8% by more than 20%, which suggests
that the magnitude of bias in King is generally mild, but nevertheless non-negligible.
2Other techniques (such as those in Chapter III) can significantly expand this
database.
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Fig. 2. King estimates the latency from host A to B.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2. studies previous
work. Sections 2.3. and 2.4. outline issues with King. Section 2.5. introduces T-King
and Section 2.6. evaluates our method, comparing it to King. Section 2.7. concludes
the chapter.
2.2. Background
The Domain Name System (DNS) [66], [67] is a distributed tree-based database that
allows for the resolution of domain names to various types of data, most notably IP
addresses. The DNS standard [67] also provides for reverse lookup of IP addresses,
which is accomplished through the IN-ADDR.ARPA domain tree. There are several
types of servers and clients that operate on DNS and to avoid confusion we introduce
the following terminology. In this chapter, a recursive resolver is a server that queries
the DNS and returns answers to end-hosts. Nameservers are DNS servers that main-
tain authoritative data about a subset (i.e., zone) of the domain space. Recursive
nameservers act as both a recursive resolver and a nameserver simultaneously. An
open resolver is either a recursive nameserver or a recursive resolver that responds to
recursive queries for arbitrary zones from hosts outside its local network.
King [32] uses existing DNS infrastructure to measure the latency between two
15
hosts on the Internet. The method relies on the fact that open recursive nameservers
on the Internet will attempt to resolve any valid request, which forces them to query
remote nameservers for the proper response. The time that these queries take to be
processed can be measured to determine the distance between the two nameservers.
In order for the measurements to apply to arbitrary hosts, Gummadi et al. assume
that end-hosts on the Internet are within close proximity to the authoritative DNS
nameserver that maintains DNS information about their IP address. Given this as-
sumption, King approximates the delay between hosts A and B using the latency
between their authoritative servers X and Y as shown in Fig. 2. Heuristics are used
to choose which authoritative nameserver to include in the measurements, the details
of which can be found in [32].
2.3. Understanding Original King
We refer to the main technique proposed by Gummadi et al. in [32] as Original King
(O-King). O-King has been used extensively in the literature [5], [6], [15], [21], [23],
[24], [29], [53], [57], [86], [88], [91], [96], [109], [118], [124] as a way to easily collect
latency information from the Internet; however, no formal or detailed analysis of its
pitfalls exists to date. We first describe the measurement algorithm used by O-King,
which is necessary for understanding its limitations and our proposed system later in
the chapter.
2.3.1 Measurement Algorithm
We start by defining terminology. Throughout the rest of the chapter, a query is
defined as a single DNS request sent to a remote server and an answer is the response
to a query. Queries are either recursive or iterative as defined by the DNS specification
16
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Fig. 3. O-King query sequence.
[66]. Given time ts when a query is sent and tr when the answer is received for that
query, we define a sample s to be tr − ts. We are now ready to detail the O-King
algorithm that measures delay between two nameservers.
The O-King process is illustrated in Fig. 3, where ns.example.com is a recursive
nameserver chosen by O-King as “close” to the desired IP. In the figure, each query is
labeled as either RQ for recursive query or IQ for iterative query. Answers are labeled
with A. A seed recursive query, which is represented by message numbers 1–4, is sent
to ns.example.com for the target.com domain to ensure direct contact between the
two for subsequent measurements. Messages 5 and 6 show the local latency sample Li
between the O-King client and ns.example.com, which is accomplished by a simple
iterative query that can be repeated to improve accuracy. Illustrated by messages
7–10 is the remote latency sample Ri, which uses a recursive query to measure the
delay from the O-King client to target.com (via ns.example.com) and also can be
repeated. The resulting latency estimate between ns.example.com and target.com
produced by O-King is min {Ri}−min {Li}. One of the features that makes O-King
so attractive is its ease of use; however, it has certain drawbacks that we discuss in
the remainder of this section.
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2.3.2 Zones with Multiple Authoritative Nameservers
In the original specification for DNS [66], [67], it is recommended that authoritative
nameservers be placed in geographically diverse locations on separate networks. Thus,
if connectivity is interrupted at one of the sites, the remaining nameservers would
maintain availability for the zone. Queries for a particular zone are sent to one
address in the group of nameservers, but the decision about which nameserver to
query is left up to the individual resolver implementation. As O-King requires at least
four [32] samples to converge to an accurate measurement, different nameservers are
potentially used for each sample. While this is of little consequence if all nameservers
for a zone are on the same network, in cases where the DNS specification is strictly
followed the samples could be very different, leading to inaccuracy in the final latency
estimation. This issue is illustrated in Fig. 4(a) for three samples taken by the
O-King client, where the authoritative nameservers for the target.com zone are
ns1.target.com, ns2.target.com, and ns1.alt.us.
2.3.3 DNS Forwarders
Another potential issue for O-King measurements is the use of forwarders on the
Internet by system administrators. A forwarder serves as an aggregation point for
DNS queries initiated from within a network that target external destinations. If
a recursive nameserver that is configured to forward messages receives a recursive
query for a zone it has no authority over, it sends the query to the forwarder without
notifying the end-user. The forwarder then resolves the query instead of the recursive
nameserver. This process is illustrated in Fig. 4(b), where direct contact is intended
between ns.example.com and ns1.target.com, but the query is routed through
the forwarder instead. The presence of forwarders is undetectable by O-King and
18
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Fig. 4. O-King query sequence for two different server configurations.
compromises the assumption that there is direct contact between ns.example.com
and ns1.target.com, leading to an invalid latency estimate.
2.3.4 Cache Pollution
The final concern that arises from the use of O-King is the impact it has on the
nameservers used for latency estimates. While the purpose of an authoritative DNS
nameserver is to provide accurate information about the data under its control to
the global Internet, the purpose of a DNS cache is to reduce latency strictly for local
users, those end-hosts that principally rely on the nameserver to resolve queries on
their behalf. Given that DNS caches are intended to benefit these users, we define
cache pollution to be the insertion of DNS zone data that has not been requested by
a local user into the cache of a nameserver.
O-King uses a seed query to force the recursive nameserver to cache the NS (name-
server) and A (IP address) records of all target authoritative nameservers. While this
is unlikely to cause performance problems on a small scale, initiating billions of O-
King queries could lead to a large proportion of the cache containing information that
19
was not requested by local users. Furthermore, local administrators are unlikely to
view this intrusion as benign and may take preventative steps, jeopardizing future
measurements using O-King.
2.4. Understanding Direct King
We refer to the second technique proposed in [32] as Direct King (D-King), which
involves a modification of the O-King measurement algorithm that allows for specifi-
cation of a single nameserver from the target zone. While not mentioned explicitly in
the original paper, all other aspects of D-King (i.e., nameserver selection, end-to-end
estimation assumptions) we assume to be equivalent to O-King. To our knowledge,
only Ballani et al. [6] have partially implemented D-King, which was required for
their study of IP Anycast as deployed by DNS root servers. There was no study or
analysis of D-King in [32]. We start by describing the D-King algorithm and later
discuss some of its drawbacks.
2.4.1 Measurement Algorithm
The D-King latency estimation process is illustrated in Fig. 5, where ns.example.com
is again a recursive nameserver. In contrast to O-King, where the query is sent to one
or more nameservers responsible for the target.com domain, D-King allows the user
to pick a single authoritative nameserver, which in this case is ns1.target.com. To
accomplish this, D-King requires that a domain name be registered and a nameserver
set up to resolve queries for said domain. In the figure, king.com is the example
domain and ns.king.com is its authoritative nameserver.
D-King first requires a seed query to guarantee direct contact between ns.example.com
and ns1.target.com, which is illustrated in the figure by messages 1–4. To do this,
20
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Fig. 5. D-King query sequence.
D-King initiates a recursive query to ns.example.com for 10-0-0-1.king.com, which
encodes the IP address of ns1.target.com into the query. As ns.king.com is au-
thoritative for the king.com domain, it receives the query and uses the encoded
address to respond that ns1.target.com is authoritative for the query, which is
then cached at ns.example.com. By doing so, ns.example.com will now automat-
ically forward queries for 10-0-0-1.king.com directly to ns1.target.com. Once
the cache is seeded, the actual latency measurements can be taken. Local sample
Li, represented as messages 5 and 6 in the figure, is taken in the same fashion as O-
King. Remote sample Ri, illustrated by messages 7–10, is recorded by sending queries
for random sub-domains of 10-0-0-1.king.com to ns.example.com, which directly
queries ns1.target.com as a result. Since ns1.target.com is not actually authori-
tative for the zone, it responds with an error indication, which is then echoed back
to the D-King client. The final latency estimate produced by D-King is calculated in
the same manner as that in O-King.
2.4.2 Additional Complexity
While D-King indeed eliminates the issue of zones with multiple authoritative name-
servers affecting the latency estimate, the cost of this improvement is that the D-King
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client must explicitly specify the target nameserver, which is not required by O-King.
It is not mentioned in [32] exactly how this should be accomplished, but the same
heuristic approach for discovering a close recursive nameserver applies in this case
as well. Furthermore, a domain must be registered and a nameserver set up to re-
spond to queries in the way D-King requires. One of the major benefits of O-King is
that latency estimates can be obtained from any machine with an Internet connec-
tion, whereas D-King requires this extra infrastructure. The individual must decide
whether the additional complexity is worth the improved accuracy.
2.4.3 DNS Forwarders
Along with O-King, the use of forwarders on the Internet affects D-King latency esti-
mates as well. The D-King client and authoritative nameserver for the measurement
(e.g., ns.king.com in Fig. 4(b)) are separate entities that only communicate through
the query encoded with the IP address of the target nameserver. It is inconsequen-
tial to ns.king.com that a different nameserver (i.e., the forwarder) than the one
intended by the D-King client sends it the query and caches the response. Because of
this lack of communication between the components of the D-King latency estimates,
forwarders remain undetected and affect the results in the same manner as discussed
in the O-King case.
2.4.4 Cache Pollution
The seed query required by D-King plants authoritative data for the registered domain
(e.g., king.com) at the recursive nameserver in a similar fashion to that required by
O-King. However, there are differences in the impact on local DNS caches. The
O-King seed query forces the caching of data for all authoritative nameservers of
the target zone, whereas D-King caches data for a single nameserver. In contrast to
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O-King, where the cached entries might have some future use to the local users, the
D-King entry is only useful to the latency estimate. At the scale of billions of queries,
if D-King is used the nameserver’s cache would contain fewer entries than O-King,
but those entries would be entirely useless to local users.
2.5. Turbo King
In this section we propose Turbo King (T-King) to address the drawbacks previously
highlighted. We start by giving a high-level overview of the system then finish the
section with detailed descriptions of the various components.
2.5.1 Design
Turbo King is a stand-alone service that accepts as arguments the IP addresses of
end-hosts A and B from the Internet and returns the estimated latency from host
A to B. It is currently implemented to resolve single estimate requests for end-host
pairs.
To accomplish this goal, Turbo King maintains a large list S of N nameservers
positioned throughout the Internet, which includes both recursive nameservers and
non-recursive authoritative nameservers found in the DNS hierarchy. This list allows
us to discover the closest nameserver without relying strictly on heuristic methods
or assuming that the authoritative nameserver responsible for A’s IP address is the
closest nameserver to A. Turbo King first uses BGP data [92] to match the IP address
of A to a recursive nameserver. If a match is found, the two are likely to reside in the
same network. If no matching nameserver is found in the same network as the end-
host, we simply find the recursive nameserver that has the longest matching prefix
to A or select the default nameserver authoritative for A’s IP address. Turbo King
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then repeats the same process for B but expands the set of possible nameservers to
include those that are not recursive. This is done because the target nameserver need
not resolve recursive queries for the estimate to succeed.
Given the two nameservers, Turbo King then generates a latency estimate be-
tween them (the algorithm is described below) and returns the result. T-King operates
in one of two modes. The default is passive, whereby T-King waits for requests before
generating latency estimates. Estimates are cached for a configurable amount of time
(e.g., 30 minutes) such that subsequent requests using the same two nameservers do
not trigger a new measurement. This mode puts the least strain on resources as it only
visits popular destinations. The optional mode we call active, in which Turbo King
preemptively takes latency estimates between nameservers on the list so as to eventu-
ally obtain an entire N ×N delay matrix.3 This mode consumes more resources and
possibly produces estimates that are never used, but it reduces the user-perceived
delay and allows the matrix to be directly downloaded for use in applications and
other research studies.
2.5.2 Discovering Nameservers
Turbo King is most effective when its list S of nameservers is large, such that at
least one nameserver is “close” to every IP address that is currently in use on the
Internet. The current version of T-King compiles its list of nameservers by perform-
ing exhaustive crawls4 of the IN-ADDR.ARPA reverse DNS tree using the techniques
3For N = 117, 863 used in the current version and one query per 22 seconds per
DNS server, the entire matrix consisting of 13.8 billion measurements can be built in
30 days.
4Analysis shows that 85% of nameservers found by T-King in Nov. 2006 were
active in Dec. 2007, which suggests that monthly or even annual re-scanning of the
tree should keep the DNS server set relatively fresh.
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Fig. 6. Turbo King query sequence.
introduced in [42]. In contrast to [42], which accepts cached (i.e., non-authoritative)
entries to queries because they are only interested in the number of hosts represented
in the tree, our crawler probes the entire depth of the reverse tree by accepting only
authoritative answers, which maximizes the number of nameservers found. Results
from this crawl are presented in the next section, but we should note that significantly
larger datasets can be built using other techniques (e.g., N = 333, 963 in [64], over
580, 000 in [114], and approximately 4.4M stable servers as shown in Chapter III).
As these results represent a large jump in S and contain more than 10M unreliable
responses, further study is required to validate and use such servers.
2.5.3 Measurement Algorithm
Our proposed algorithm is illustrated in Fig. 6, where Turbo King operates as a
multi-threaded application with both the client and server operations communicating
seamlessly. This allows timestamps to be taken for every packet sent or received by
our software, which reduces the number of queries required to complete an estimate.
During step 1, DNSClient takes a timestamp and initiates a query to ns.example.com
for the domain we control, namely irl-tamu.us. Since DNSServer is listed with the
.us registrar as the authoritative nameserver for this domain, host ns.example.com
recursively queries DNSServer in step 2. At step 3, our software takes another times-
tamp and answers with a referral saying that ns1.target.com is authoritative for
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the query, but sets the TTL for this information to zero, meaning that it should not
be cached [67].5 Nameserver ns.example.com then directly queries ns1.target.com,
which answers with some form of error indication (steps 4–5). That error indication
is forwarded back to DNSClient in step 6, which then takes the third and final times-
tamp, allowing us to estimate the latency between nameservers ns.example.com and
ns1.target.com as d36−d12 where dij is the delay between steps i and j. Thus, Turbo
King is able to determine the latency between ns.example.com and ns1.target.com
without seeding the cache of ns.example.com by judiciously taking timestamps at
every point of communication between ns.example.com and the T-King software.
2.5.4 Detection and Avoidance of Forwarders
While both O-King and D-King are unable to detect forwarders, they are simple to
detect with Turbo King due to its integrated infrastructure and can be eliminated from
the measurement. Because T-King acts as both the client and the server application
for the latency estimate, it simply compares the IP addresses that are used to contact
DNSClient and DNSServer respectively for a particular query. If different IP addresses
are used, T-King excludes the original IP from the list of recursive nameservers and
determines if the forwarder allows for recursion, adding it to the list of possible
nameservers if so. A new closest server to the IP is retrieved from the list of recursive
nameservers and the latency estimate restarts. While there is some small additional
delay in returning an answer to the end-user when in passive mode, the resulting
estimate is not tainted by the presence of a forwarder.
5We found that 35 of the 117, 817 discovered recursive nameservers were either
misconfigured or non-compliant with [67] and ignored zero TTL.
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Table I. Results of reverse DNS crawl (3.8 GHz Pentium 4)
T-King ISC [42]
Month run Nov. 2006 Jul. 2006
Duration (hours) 33.8 240
Queries/Sec 5, 300 (2.3 mb/s) 751 (0.3 mb/s)
Queries Completed 649, 270, 000 N/A
IPs Discovered 439, 431, 355 439, 286, 364
Nameservers 216, 843 89, 592
Recursive Nameservers 117, 817 N/A
2.6. Evaluation
In this section we evaluate the effectiveness of Turbo King for providing accurate la-
tency measurements and its suitability for large-scale studies compared to O-King and
D-King. We start by discussing our efforts to discover a large number of nameservers,
then perform several real-world measurements to compare the three algorithms.
2.6.1 Results from Reverse DNS Crawl
Because of the large number of queries required to complete the IN-ADDR.ARPA crawl,
we designed and implemented a multi-threaded DNS resolver to collect a list of name-
servers and authority data for all zones in the reverse lookup tree. The results of one
particular crawl executed in November 2006 are summarized in Table I, where both
Turbo King and ISC [42] found roughly the same number of IP addresses in the
tree; however, our crawler was approximately seven times faster and discovered 2.4
times more nameservers. Examination of the nameservers we discovered revealed that
117, 817 of them support recursive queries. Using the T-King client, we profiled each
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Table II. Coverage of the Internet with discovered servers
All Recursive Total
Countries 190 174 232 [40]
AS 13, 017 10, 895 23, 773 [37]
BGP Prefixes 48, 196 31, 059 219, 110 [92]
IPs covered 1, 031, 736, 562 828, 675, 500 1, 642, 441, 178
Web servers 3, 192, 918 2, 659, 379 3, 638, 433
Gnutella peers 1, 734, 483 1, 338, 217 3, 534, 300
of the recursive nameservers in our list and found that 32% use a forwarder to resolve
queries for zones not under their control.
We next study the coverage of the Internet by all discovered nameservers and
the subset of nameservers that are recursive, which is illustrated in Table II. This
data shows that Turbo King contains a nameserver in 190 countries, covering over 13
thousand ASes, 48 thousand BGP prefixes [92], and 1.03 billion IP addresses out of
1.6 billion advertised by BGP [92]. We performed further analysis of how well the
discovered BGP prefixes cover 3.5 million Gnutella peers found in prior work [116]
and 3.6 million web servers (hosting over 6.3 billion webpages) found by our unrelated
web-crawling project. These numbers show that 49% of peers and 88% of web servers
reside in BGP prefixes that contain at least one nameserver discovered by T-King.
For the subset of nameservers that are recursive, Turbo King found nameservers
in 174 countries, representing nearly 11 thousand ASes, 31 thousand BGP prefixes,
and 828 million IP addresses. This resulted in a coverage of 37% of Gnutella peers and
73% of webservers. While T-King is able to find a nameserver in the same network for
a large percentage of end-hosts (especially web servers), the relatively low percentage
of Gnutella peers covered indicates that we should aim to discover more recursive
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resolvers used by home-based Internet connections in the future.
2.6.1.1 Analyzing Zone Authority Data
Of further interest is the percentage of zones in the reverse lookup tree that contain
multiple authoritative nameservers, which we examined by recording the set of name-
servers authoritative for every zone during the IN-ADDR.ARPA crawl. The accuracy of
O-King estimates is only significantly affected if one or more of the nameservers for a
zone is in a different network, making it likely for O-King to produce conflicting re-
sults over multiple samples. We downloaded 219, 110 BGP prefixes from RouteViews
[92] and matched each nameserver’s IP to one or more prefixes, then examined the
nameserver set for every zone in the reverse lookup tree. We found that 49% of reverse
lookup zones contain at least one nameserver in their set that is in a different network.
While this is a striking result, it is possible that the unmatched nameserver could be
in another network under the same administrative control that is well-connected to
the rest of the nameservers in the set.
Accurately determining administrative control for a large number of networks
is difficult, but it stands to reason that if all nameservers for a zone share a single
domain name, they are more likely to be under one organization’s administrative
control. While the process is easy for generic top-level domains (gTLDs), it is signif-
icantly more complex for country-coded TLDs (ccTLDs) as most countries created
sub-domains from which people could purchase their own domains (e.g., .com.es).
We compiled a comprehensive list of these sub-domains for each ccTLD and hereby re-
fer to this list and the set of gTLDs as pay-level domains (PLDs). We again evaluated
the nameserver set for each zone and found that 33% have at least one nameserver in
their authority set that both resides in a different network and has a different PLD
than the other nameservers. It is very likely that the accuracy of O-King queries for
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Fig. 7. Comparison of O-King to D-King for zone with two nameservers.
these zones will be negatively impacted.
2.6.2 Causes of Inaccuracy
In this section we compare O-King and D-King to Turbo King using latency esti-
mates they produce from the Internet. To remove variability caused by differences in
architecture, we implemented all three algorithms using the same timing and socket
mechanisms and ran all of the tests from a single Windows 2003 x64 machine. To
highlight the differences in accuracy, we focus only on the actual latency estimate
between nameservers and note that T-King should perform no worse than O-King
or D-King in selecting a “close” recursive nameserver. In many cases it will perform
better, but we leave such analysis for future work.
2.6.2.1 Zones with Multiple Authoritative Nameservers
To illustrate the impact of authoritative nameservers in different networks on O-King
estimates, we chose a zone with two authoritative nameservers and used O-King
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Fig. 8. Convergence of O-King estimate for zone with two nameservers.
to generate 100 latency estimates to a target IP in the zone. We then used D-
King to estimate the latency to the two individual authoritative nameservers for the
zone. In Fig. 7(a) the sequence of O-King estimates are individual points and the
two D-King estimates are represented as lines. O-King performs as expected and
vacillates between the two nameservers arbitrarily. This is further demonstrated in
Fig. 7(b), where roughly 60% of the time O-King chose NS 1 as the preferred server.
We confirmed that this behavior also occurs in zones with more than two nameservers,
but omit these examples for brevity.
We next analyze the convergence properties of O-King measurements for zones
with multiple authoritative nameservers. To determine exactly what happens to the
latency estimate when the number of samples increases, we use the measurement data
from above and plot in Fig. 8(a) the CDF of latency estimates for sample sizes one
through five. From inspecting the figure, it quickly becomes apparent that the higher
latency samples are ignored and are effectively removed from the overall estimate as
the sample size increases. This is further illustrated in Fig. 8(b), where the latency
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estimated by O-King using four samples is plotted with D-King measurements using
one sample. As the figure clearly shows, the O-King measurement is nearly identical
to the measurement given by D-King to NS 1.
There are two insights that can be gained from this behavior. The first is that
the requirement of at least four samples per measurement proposed in [32] for O-
King is at least partially due to the natural differences in latency between multiple
authoritative nameservers for a particular zone. In contrast, D-King provides the
same latency estimate with one sample in this case. The second issue is that O-King
always biases its estimates towards the lowest latency nameserver of a zone. While
in some cases this might be the server located closest to the target end-host, there is
no evidence that this happens in the general case.
2.6.2.2 DNS Forwarders
The impact of forwarders on both O-King and D-King latency estimates largely de-
pends on the proximity of the forwarder to the original recursive nameserver. If the
two servers are on the same local network, any additional latency should be rather
small. To quantify the likelihood of this event, we matched both the forwarder and
the original recursive nameserver to their advertised BGP prefixes from RouteViews
[92] and discovered that 45% of the time the two servers did not reside on the same
network. To demonstrate the inaccuracy introduced by the presence of forwarders,
we took 100 latency estimates using all three algorithms from a recursive nameserver
known to use a forwarder to a zone with a single authoritative nameserver (this rules
out effects from multiple authoritative nameservers on O-King). The resulting la-
tency estimates are illustrated in Fig. 9(a), which compares O-King to T-King, and
in Fig. 9(b), which compares D-King to T-King. In both figures O-King and D-King
overestimate latency due to the presence of the forwarder, whereas T-King does not.
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Fig. 9. Forwarder affect on O-King and D-King (single nameserver zone).
The D-King estimate is larger than O-King due to multiple attempts to resolve the
query by the forwarder, a problem that is mentioned in [32] and accounted for in
T-King.
2.6.3 Measurement-based Comparison
To study Turbo King in more depth, we performed 2, 450 latency estimates on the
Internet using 50 recursive nameservers from the previously discovered set for both
T-King and O-King over various measurement sample sizes. From this data we show
that T-King measurements are indeed different from those produced by O-King. We
then show that Turbo King converges to a consistent latency estimate in two samples
instead of the four suggested in [32]. D-King is omitted from this section, but the re-
sults are consistent with those found in the previous section. D-King is more accurate
than O-King, but less so than T-King due to its inability to detect forwarders.
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Fig. 10. T-King vs. O-King to validate implementation and show differences.
2.6.3.1 Turbo King versus O-King Estimates
Before comparing Turbo King to O-King in a general case, we first consider the two
algorithms for a target zone with a single authoritative nameserver using a recursive
nameserver that we verified does not use a forwarder. Because we eliminated all of
the factors that skew O-King estimates, the two should produce the same value. The
result is illustrated in Fig. 10(a), with the estimates produced by O-King as data
points and the average estimate by T-King as a line to allow the reader to distinguish
between the two. The figure clearly shows that T-King produces latency estimates
that are equivalent to O-King in such idealized cases.
We next compare the 2, 450 latency estimates produced by Turbo King to those
by O-King, which is shown in Fig. 10(b). To highlight differences between the two,
we generated a ratio of the estimates by dividing O-King’s value by T-King’s, so that
if O-King and T-King produced identical values, the CDF would be a straight line
at one on the x-axis. Note that in this case we used four samples for each estimate
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as suggested in [32]. From the data, 15% of O-King estimates are more than 10%
different from T-King measurements, and 8% of O-King measurements are more than
20% different from those generated by T-King.
2.6.3.2 Convergence of Estimates
Previously, we showed that zones with multiple authoritative nameservers are one
of the reasons O-King requires at least four samples to produce a latency estimate.
In this section, we expand that study by examining the convergence properties of
both T-King and O-King, showing that over a wide range of estimates Turbo King
converges to a consistent estimate with fewer samples than required by O-King. To
accomplish this, we repeated the above 2, 450 latency estimates using sample sizes
varying from one to four for both algorithms. We collected two estimates for each
sample size and calculated the ratio of both O-King to O-King and T-King to T-King.
The goal is to provide consistent estimates for latency, so we plotted the CDF of the
ratio in Fig. 11(a) for O-King and Fig. 11(b) for T-King, with each line representing
the number of samples used to produce the estimate. In the O-King case, illustrated
in Fig. 11(a), improvement in the consistency of estimates is apparent as the number
of samples increases to four, whereas in the Turbo King case (Fig. 11(b)) the greatest
improvement is from one sample to two, with little afterward. From these graphs we
conclude that the recommendation of four samples in [32] is sound for O-King and
that T-King produces an accurate sample using only two samples.
2.6.4 Overhead Analysis
In this section we study the resources required of DNS nameservers and the Internet
for all three algorithms. In particular, we are interested in how the three compare for
large-scale estimates involving more than 100, 000 recursive nameservers discovered
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Fig. 11. Convergence of measured latencies for O-King and T-King.
by Turbo King. We start by examining the number of queries sent to capture the
network overhead, then discuss cache pollution for large-scale measurements.
2.6.4.1 Network Overhead
To study network overhead, we consider the number of queries required to perform
all-to-all latency estimates for the 100, 000 recursive nameservers, which is 10 billion
estimates. In this calculation, we included every query initiated either by or on behalf
of the measurement client, and used the number of samples required to produce
consistent latency estimates: four for O-King and two for D-King and T-King. Due
to the lack of seeding, Turbo King requires 70 billion queries to complete 10 billion
latency estimates. D-King needs 100 billion queries for the measurement, which is
1.43 times more than required by T-King. Finally, O-King uses 150 billion queries, or
2.14 times more than Turbo King and 1.5 times more than D-King. Thus, designing
T-King to be more accurate and to avoid seeding led to a significant reduction in
bandwidth usage.
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We next consider the impact each algorithm has on DNS caches under the same
measurement conditions.
2.6.4.2 Cache Pollution
We examine cache pollution by calculating the total number of DNS records inserted
into the cache of the 100, 000 recursive nameservers. Each entry includes two records,
an NS record and an A (IP address) record. Since O-King causes recursive nameservers
to seed the cache with every authoritative nameserver for a zone, we used the reverse
crawl data to find an average of 2.4 nameservers per zone. Thus, O-King would
cause the insertion of 48 billion entries into cache for the nameservers used in the
measurement. D-King needs a single set of records for each latency estimate, which
means that 20 billion entries would be saved in caches on its behalf. Turbo King
only requires that the local domain (e.g., irl-tamu.us) be cached at each recursive
nameserver, which implies merely 200, 000 total cache pollution entries. To compare,
Turbo King requires 0.0004% of the total entries caused by O-King and 0.001% of
those initiated by D-King, clearly making Turbo King much more appropriate for
large-scale measurement studies.
2.7. Summary
In this chapter we showed that King, a previous distance estimation method, suffers
from non-negligible error when DNS zones employ geographically diverse authori-
tative servers or utilize forwarders, both of which are very common in the existing
Internet. We also showed that King requires insertion of numerous unwanted DNS
records in caches of remote servers (which is called cache pollution) and requires large
traffic overhead when deployed in large-scale. To overcome these limitations, we pro-
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posed the Turbo King latency estimation framework that obtains end-to-end delay
samples without bias in the presence of distant authoritative servers and forwarders,
while consuming half the bandwidth needed by King and reducing the impact of cache
pollution by several orders of magnitude. We also demonstrated through several ex-
periments that Turbo King is more accurate that prior methods.
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CHAPTER III
IRLSCANNER
3.1. Introduction
Characterizing visible services in the Internet (e.g., web sites [10], [34], [52], end-hosts
[35], [37],[42]), discovering and patching servers with critical security vulnerabilities
(e.g., SSH [82], DNS [25]), and understanding how Internet worms create massive
botnets [17], [45], [62], [108] are important research topics that directly benefit from
efficient and scalable scanning techniques that can quickly discover available services
in the Internet.
Our focus in this chapter is on horizontal scanning [107], which is a method for
enumerating (in some set S) all remote hosts that support a given protocol/service p.
This is accomplished by sending packets to destinations in S and counting positive
responses within some time interval. We call a scan complete if each address in S is
probed and partial otherwise. The latter type of scan significantly reduces the burden
on remote networks and is useful when an estimate of the number of responsive hosts
(rather than their IP addresses) is sufficient.
While several large-scale measurements have been conducted in the past [10],
[25], [35], [83], researchers initially considering a similar project are often faced with
delays on the order of months for individual tests to run [10], [83]. During this time,
computational resources of potentially dozens [10] of local machines that could be put
to other uses are tied up. Further complicating the issue is the possibility of facing a
significant number of complaints from hostile network administrators [10], [13], [18],
[25], [30], [35], [82], [83], even for partial measurements. Given these issues, questions
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arise about the feasibility of service discovery [14], especially on sensitive TCP ports.
Evidence suggests that sometimes [35] researchers are even forced to abort planned
activities due to the negative publicity generated by scan traffic.
Since previous work has not explicitly aimed to design a high-performance scan-
ner and/or maximize its politeness, there is no standard by which to judge the quality
or intrusiveness of a scanner. Our first step then is to propose three main objec-
tives that a good Internet-wide scanning solution must satisfy: 1) efficient usage of
resources (i.e., bandwidth, CPU, memory) in complete scans; 2) accuracy of extrap-
olation in partial scans; and 3) maximum politeness at remote networks. The first
objective ensures that the implementation scales well when scan duration T is reduced
to hours or even minutes. The second objective delivers a platform for extremely fast
partial scans with accurate extrapolation of metrics of interest. The last objective
maximally reduces the instantaneous load (i.e., burstiness) applied to target subnets
and controls the rate of IDS activity (i.e., false-positive alarms, wasted investigation
effort, and dynamic firewall blocks against the scanner network) in response to scan
traffic.
We next build a scanner that satisfies these goals and evaluate its performance
in real scans.
3.1.1 Our Contributions
The first part of the chapter analyzes the approaches exposed in the literature to
understand whether they can be used to optimize performance, politeness, and ex-
trapolation ability of an Internet-wide scanner. In addition to realizing that prior
work was not driven by any particular objectives in designing their scanners (be-
sides obtaining the data of interest in some finite amount of time), we also reach the
conclusion that there is no consensus on such important parameters as scan scope,
40
permutation, split among source IPs, timeouts, handling of complaints, and monitor-
ing of the scan’s intrusiveness at remote networks.
To overcome this problem, the second part of the chapter presents our design
of IRLscanner, which is a high-performance and source-IP scalable framework for
service discovery in the Internet. The central element of the scanner is a novel per-
mutation/split algorithm, which we show is optimally polite at each CIDR subnet s
as it spaces probes arriving to s equally throughout scan duration [0, T ], even with
multiple source IPs. Extrapolation results with IRLscanner running at its default
rate r (at which it covers the Internet in T = 24 hours) demonstrate that partial
scans of our approach are unbiased, leading to 1% estimation error in the number of
live hosts in just 10 seconds.
Due to the goal of allowing faster scan durations (i.e., minutes/hours) and po-
liteness concerns, IRLscanner incorporates additional features that help it achieve
our objectives. These include a significantly reduced scope of measurements (i.e., one
billion packets fewer) compared to previous scanners, absence of largely ineffective
retransmissions, ability to run with any number of IPs aliased to the same server,
capture of all back-scan and bogus traffic (e.g., from hackers and buggy implementa-
tions), and significantly higher timeouts for unresponsive targets, which allows it to
capture a wider variety of busy/slow hosts in the Internet than was possible before.
Armed with IRLscanner, the third part of the chapter highlights 20 Internet-
wide scans across a wide range of protocols and ports, including DNS (port 53),
HTTP (port 80), SMTP (port 25), EPMAP (port 135), and UDP ECHO (port 7).
In addition to running over 20 times faster than any prior scanner and probing ports
that have never been scanned in the literature (i.e., SMTP, ECHO, EPMAP), we
experiment with several novel techniques (e.g., ACK scanning) and perform the first
large-scale OS fingerprinting study of 44M hosts responding to port 80.
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We finish the chapter by analyzing the feedback generated from our experiments.
This includes a detailed complaint analysis, techniques for monitoring the impact of
scan traffic on IDS activity in the Internet, approaches for a-priori predicting the
amount of blowback in response to scanning a particular port, and various ways for
reducing the perceived maliciousness of the scan.
3.1.2 Ethical Implications
Over the last 2 years, we have closely worked with university officials and taken
numerous steps (see below) in an effort to reduce investigation effort and aggravation
for remote administrators. While our interest in this chapter is purely to expose
the underlying issues of service discovery and make it more accessible to researchers
without damaging remote networks, one concern might be that our scan techniques are
not only maximally polite, but also optimally stealthy against popular IDS packages.
As a result, one could argue that attackers could benefit from our work and thus
inflict certain damage that would not otherwise be possible.
However, we do not believe this to be the case. First, as hackers must constantly
remain two steps ahead of the security community to be able to exploit the imple-
mented defenses, our results are not necessarily novel or useful to them. Instead, we
believe that the discussion and techniques exposed in this chapter might be useful
in building future defenses against scanning worms. Second, stealthier scanning by
itself does not compromise hosts; in contrast, intrusion using malicious payload (e.g.,
delivered through unsolicited packets or email) does. As a result, many networks with
patched hosts and up-to-date IDS signatures of various malware should remain well
protected despite the findings of this chapter. Third, botnets afford hackers such a
diverse pool of IPs that they often do not care to remain stealthy and rely on the
most basic sequential scanning [3], which apparently is sufficient for their purposes.
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Another concern might be that we are collecting information about remote net-
works that their administrators do not wish to make public. We contend that such
information is well-protected by firewalls, and this chapter makes no attempt to trick
or confuse network monitoring devices to gather sensitive data. Further, given the
constant background scanning performed by attackers [78], any data (and likely much
more) we collect is already available to them. However, to ensure privacy, we do not
publicize any information about individual networks collected during our scans and
instead rely only on summary statistics.
3.2. Scanner Design
Beyond the measurement-specific choice of the protocol/port pair that uniquely char-
acterize a service, every researcher considering a horizontal scan must answer a com-
mon set of questions before proceeding. In this section, we turn to several recent stud-
ies [10], [25], [35], [83] that have performed large-scale service discovery to determine
whether these design questions have been definitively answered and our objectives
met.
3.2.1 Scan Scope
We start with the issue of which IP addresses to target when scanning. Define F
to be the Internet IPv4 address space, which consists of n = 232 addresses available
for scanning. While intuition may suggest to probe the entire space to ensure com-
pleteness, certain IPs may not be suitable for scanning. Before delving into details,
define set NR ⊆ F to be all non-reserved destinations [38], I ⊆ NR to be all IANA-
allocated blocks [39], and B ⊆ I to be the set of IPs advertised in BGP prefixes [128]
at the border router of the scanner network.
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To capture the choice of which destinations to target, we define scan scope S to
be the subset of F probed during measurement. As shown in the second column of
Table III, all previous Internet-wide service discovery projects scanned at least the
IANA allocated space I, which is justified [35], [65] by churn in BGP routing tables
and desire to avoid losing responses during the period of the experiment (i.e., 30+
days in Table III). In [10], however, no reason is given for scanning unallocated space,
although there is a slight possibility of new blocks being allocated by IANA during
the measurement.
As we discuss later, sets I and NR may be appropriate for slow scans; however,
faster scanners have little incentive to utilize sets larger than B in the current Internet
since performance concerns (i.e., volume of sent traffic) usually outweigh completeness
of scan results.
3.2.2 Scan Order
The next factor we consider is the order in which IP addresses are scanned. This
is determined by the permutation [108] of space S, which is simply a reordering of
target addresses to achieve some desired result. The chosen permutation controls the
burstiness of traffic seen by remote networks and is a significant factor in both the
perceived politeness of scan traffic and estimation accuracy of Internet-wide metrics
from partial scans. For all discussion below, we assume that target subnets s are full
CIDR blocks (i.e., given in the /b notation).
The most basic approach, which we call IP-sequential, does not shuﬄe the address
space and probes it in numerical order (e.g., 10.0.0.1, 10.0.0.2, 10.0.0.3, etc.). It is not
only simple to implement, but also routinely used in the Internet [3], [41], [59] and
measurement studies [8], [34]. IP-sequential targets individual subnets s with a burst
of |s| consecutive packets at the rate of n/T before moving on to another network.
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Besides extremely high sending rates to s regardless of its size (e.g., 37 Kpps for
S = I and T = 24 hours), IP-sequential also suffers from poor extrapolation ability.
The main alternative to IP-sequential is the uniform permutation [108] also ex-
tensively used in the literature [10], [25], [82], [83]. This approach draws targets
uniformly randomly from the full address space S and intermingles probes to many
subnets, which reduces instantaneous load on individual networks and produces unbi-
ased random sampling during partial scans. In the literature, the uniform permutation
is usually accomplished by either an LCG (linear congruential generator) [55] or some
encryption algorithm applied sequentially to each element of S (e.g., TEA [82]), both
of which ensure that no IP is probed twice.
The final approach proposed in [35] we call Reverse IP-sequential (RIS) due to
its reversal of bits in the IP-sequential permutation and targeting the same address in
each subnet (e.g., *.*.127.10, *.*.8.10, *.*.248.10, etc.) before moving on to another
address. Intuition suggests that RIS is poorly suited for extrapolation (which we
confirm below), while the uniform permutation fails to deliver packets with maximum
spacing to each subnet. Since no analysis exists to further evaluate the differences
between these three permutation algorithms, making an informed choice remains an
open problem.
3.2.3 Scan Origin
In a bid to obtain multiple vantage points [35] and decrease the time required to
complete the scan [10], past measurement studies have often distributed the burden
of scanning amongst several hosts. We call this process a split, which in the literature
parcels blocks of either contiguous [8], [10] or permuted [35], [83] IP addresses to m
scanning nodes. Column four of Table III contains values for m used previously, with
[35] being the only study that used multiple hosts residing on two different networks
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(four at each location).
The current consensus in the literature is that multiple scanning hosts on a
single network are necessary only if the full assigned scanning bandwidth cannot be
utilized by one host, a condition that is implied in [83] and mentioned explicitly in
[8], [10], [35]. However, it is not clear from these studies how many hosts are needed
to efficiently utilize a link or provide reasonably short scan durations. Further, the
literature does not consider the split’s impact on the perceived politeness of the scan,
which we tackle later in the chapter.
3.2.4 Extrapolation
In many research applications, especially those that monitor growth of the Internet
[35], [42], it is sufficient to obtain the number of live hosts or estimate their charac-
teristics (e.g., mean uptime) rather than a list of their exact IPs. The best approach
in such cases is a partial scan, which produces a tiny footprint at remote networks
and in many cases allows accurate extrapolation of metrics of interest. This requires
that targets within each subnet be randomly selected, without any bias being given
to certain parts of S or particular patterns within probed IP addresses (because the
density of live hosts varies both across the Internet and the last 1 − 2 bytes of the
IP). In addition, non-random probing is often seen by administrators as purposefully
malicious, which in turn leads to unnecessary investigation overhead, firewall blocks,
and complaints.
3.2.5 Implementation
The next pressing issue of service discovery is the method used to send/receive pack-
ets, which significantly impacts the efficiency of the scanner. The easiest imple-
mentation method uses scripts that execute pre-written utilities [34], [83] or existing
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scanners [8]. An alternative is to write a custom scanner for a particular measure-
ment, which opens the possibility of using connectionless sockets [25], [35] for ICMP
or UDP-based scans, connection-oriented TCP sockets [10], and finally raw IP sockets
for TCP SYN scans [82], [83]. While there is no consensus in the scanning literature
on what method to use, [26] suggests that software limitations on packet sending rates
can be overcome using a network subsystem that bypasses the default network stack.
3.2.6 Timeouts and Duration
The next two issues are when to mark a host as unresponsive and what aspects should
determine scan duration T . The former issue comes down to two choices: 1) waiting
a “safe” amount of time before retransmitting [10], [82], [83]; and 2) when to finally
time out and declare targets dead [35]. Note that both incur substantial overhead due
to the need to remember all covered destinations and to maintain numerous timers.
Furthermore, it is unclear what benefit retransmission carries given the low packet
loss on the backbone and whether the increased overhead (i.e., doubling or tripling
the number of sent packets) justifies the potentially minuscule accuracy gains.
Table III lists timeout values that range from 5 to 30 seconds for previous mea-
surements studies. Given the limited number of outstanding sockets, finite bandwidth
and CPU power, and a wide range of possible choices, it remains unclear how to choose
timeouts to simultaneously allow for efficiency and accuracy (e.g., certain busy servers
respond with a 60-second delay, but should they be captured by the scanner?).
After settling the above problems, it is important to ensure that the scan will
complete in such amount of time T that produces the most relevant data without
overburdening local/remote network resources. Of the measurement studies listed
in Table III, only [25] was unencumbered by software/hardware restrictions, while
for others these issues dominated the choice of T . As such, previous measurement
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studies have generally been limited to a tradeoff between small T , few serversm, large
timeouts, and large scan scope. Instead, our goal is to develop a scanner in which the
researcher can control T independently of all other listed parameters.
3.2.7 Negative Feedback
Due to the unsolicited nature of the packets sent by service discovery measurement
studies and the diversity of networks in the Internet, it is inevitable that some tar-
geted hosts will take offense. This often manifests itself in the form of email/phone
complaints from network administrators [10], [18], [25], [35], [82], [83], though the
literature is lacking in details on the exact nature of complaints (e.g., frequency of
legal threats) and specific techniques for dealing with them.
In Table III, we list three of the methods used by previous studies to mitigate
complaints. The first is the use of a blacklist by [35], [82], [83] to exclude the networks
of sensitive/suspicious administrators, which generally avoids repeated complaints
from the same network. The other two approaches boil down to a further reduction in
scope by the omission of network/broadcast IP addresses (i.e., *.*.*.0 and *.*.*.255)
[35], [83] and preemptively blacklisting networks before they complain (e.g., U.S.
government) [25]. While blacklisting complaining parties is undoubtedly a sound
approach, no reasoning or motivating factors have been provided for the other two
methods and it is unclear whether they are indeed necessary.
3.3. IRLscanner
Based on our analysis of scanning literature in the last section, it appears that re-
searchers interested in service discovery projects are faced with scan durations on
the order of months, tying up several machines that could be d
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projects, and the likelihood of significant negative feedback that could easily lead to
the measurement being terminated. For example, [35] reports that TCP scans pro-
duce 30 times more complaints than ICMP scans, which has precluded the authors
from conducting them after the first attempt.
Assuming a fixed amount of bandwidth available for scanning, in this section we
seek to alleviate these concerns by designing a service discovery tool we call IRLscan-
ner that allows for very small scan durations T , originates from a single inexpensive
host, and minimizes aggravation of network administrators (both remote and local)
by scanning as politely as possible for a given T .
3.3.1 Scan Scope
We start by determining the scope of IRLscanner. While firewalls and routers rou-
tinely use the Bogons list [22] to filter nonsensical traffic (i.e., reserved and unallocated
blocks), packets destined to unadvertised BGP blocks are also dropped by the scan-
ner’s border router, but only after unnecessarily increasing router load and wasting
scanner resources. Therefore, one expects that only set B should normally produce
valid results or be used for discovering hosts responsive to unicast traffic. However,
given that BGP tables change dramatically in the long-term [65], restricting the scope
to only routable addresses either requires a live BGP feed or potentially allows for
inaccurate representation of the Internet in the resulting measurement.
While this is definitely a concern for slow scanners (i.e., T is weeks or months),
our goal is to complete measurements in much shorter periods (i.e., hours) during
which BGP changes can often be neglected. For fast scans, updates pulled from
RouteViews [93] at start time sufficiently approximate the routable space during the
entire experiment. Our analysis of BGP tables during August 2009 discovered less
than 0.1% difference over a 10-day period, with proportionally fewer changes during
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Table IV. Scan set size, Ethernet bandwidth, and packets/second in a 24 hour TCP
SYN scan
Set S Size Reduction Rate (Mbps) Rate (Kpps)
F 4.29B – 33.4 49.7
NR 3.7B 14% 28.8 42.8
I 3.27B 24% 25.4 37.8
B 2.11B 51% 16.4 24.4
T = 24 hours used in our experiments. While for IRLscanner it makes sense to only
probe B, the tradeoff between scope, duration T , and BGP table accuracy must be
determined on a case-by-case basis.
To gauge the potential gains from restricting the scope to routable destinations,
we determine [39], [93] the current state of sets B, NR, and I in late August 2009
and list them in Table IV. While previous scanners achieve a significant reduction
(i.e., by 24%) in the number of sent packets by omitting the reserved/unallocated
space, probing only set B removes almost one billion additional targets and doubles
the performance gains of previous work to 51%. The table also shows the bandwidth
necessary to complete the scan in 24 hours, where all 40-byte SYN packets are padded
to 84-byte minimum-size Ethernet frames, and the corresponding pps (packets per
second) rate.
To implement a scanner with scope B, it is necessary to obtain a timely BGP
dump from either the RouteViews project [93] or the local border router. Given
the desire for small scan durations on inexpensive hardware, checking individual IP
addresses against a list of roughly 300, 000 prefixes must be very efficient. While IP
checking can be accomplished with a balanced binary tree [25] with logarithmic lookup
complexity, IRLscanner uses a 512 MB hash table, where each bit indicates whether
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the corresponding IP is allowed or not. This ensures that checks are accomplished
in O(1) time and improves lookup speed from 923 Kpps (balanced tree) to 11 Mpps
(using a single core of a 2.2 GHz Opteron). Given that most commodity machines
have at least 1 GB of RAM and the rest of our scanner requires only 2 MB of main
memory, this tradeoff allows us to dedicate more computational power to sending
packets and performing other processing as needed.
3.3.2 Scan Order
Despite the constant volume of scanning traffic in the Internet [78], network adminis-
trators generally view this activity as malicious and periodically complain to networks
that originate such traffic [25], [35] [82]. Furthermore, many IDS tools [12], [105], [125]
automatically generate firewall rules against scanning hosts, whether detected locally
or through distributed collaborative systems [71], [94]. With this perception in mind,
researchers must first weigh the benefit gained from performing a service discovery
measurement with the possibility of negative publicity for their institution and/or its
address space being blacklisted at remote networks.
Upon determining to proceed, these negative effects can be reduced for all in-
volved parties by using an address permutation that avoids targeting individual sub-
nets with large bursts of traffic, which often triggers Intrusion Detection Systems
(IDS) and raises concerns of malicious/illegal activity. Since IDS predominantly op-
erates on a per-IP basis, additional reduction in false-alarms is possible by using
multiple source IPs at the scanner host, which we discuss later in this section. While
the uniform permutation [108] is routinely used in scanning applications, no previ-
ous paper has examined the issue of achieving maximal politeness and whether such
methods could be implemented in practice. We address this open problem next.
For a given CIDR subnet s in the Internet, our goal is to maximally reduce the
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Fig. 12. Illustration of AGT.
burstiness of scan traffic seen by s, which is equivalent to maximizing inter-packet
delays for all probes arriving to s. Recalling that n = 232, we define permutations
that return to s with a period n/|s| to be IP-wide at s and those that achieve this
simultaneously for all possible CIDR subnets to be globally IP-wide (GIW). Note that
GIW permutations spread probes to each s evenly throughout [0, T ], which ensures
that all networks are probed at a constant rate |s|/T proportional to their size and
that no s can be scanned slower for a given value of T . This makes GIW optimally
polite1 across the entire Internet.
The simplest GIW technique, which we call an alternating gateway tree (AGT),
is a binary tree of depth 32 where target IPs reside in leaves and all edges are labeled
with 0/1 bits. Traversing the tree, the scanner accumulates individual bits along the
edges into the next IP. Decisions to move left or right at internal nodes (gateways) v
depend on their states θv, which are flipped during each visit to ensure that no IP is
probed twice and that packets alternate between left/right children of each gateway.
Fig. 12 shows the bottom four levels of some random AGT, where the tree in part
(a) generates an IP address ending with bits 011. Part (b) of the figure illustrates the
1While completely refraining from scanning is even more polite, it does not produce
any useful service-discovery results.
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next IP produced by this portion of the AGT, which results in the address ending
with bits 101.
Since balanced binary trees have well-defined rules for calculating the offset of
each internal node, AGTs do not require storing child pointers. Thus, their RAM
overhead is (n − 1)/8 = 512 MB needed to store tuple (θ1, . . . , θn−1) and their com-
putational complexity is 26 memory reads/writes (i.e., 52 total) per generated IP
(assuming depth-31 traversal and 64-bit lookups that yield the first 5 levels of the
tree in one RAM access).
Note that AGT provides the scanner with 2n−1 possible GIW permutations,
which is enormous. In practice, one does not require this much diversity and other
GIW algorithms may be sufficient. One reason to seek alternatives is that AGT
requires saving 512 MB during checkpointing and transmission of the same amount
of seed data to other scanner hosts in distributed implementations. Another reason
is that AGT’s CPU complexity is quite high, which we reduce in our next method.
Assume that s has depth b in the AGT (i.e., n/|s| = 2b) and observe that GIW
patterns must visit all remaining 2b − 1 subnets at depth b before returning to s. In
practice, this means that the permutation must exhibit a full period in the upper
b bits. Since for GIW this holds for all s, the full period must be simultaneously
maintained at all depths 1 ≤ b ≤ 32. Reversing the bits in each IP, we can replace
this condition with a much simpler one – the full period must hold in the lower b
bits. Define bx to be the lower b bits of an integer x and R(x) to be the bit-reversal
function. Then, we have the following result.
Theorem 1. Given a sequence of integers {xk}nk=1, suppose sequence {b(xk)}nk=1 has
a full period for all b = 1, 2, . . . , 32. Then, sequence {R(32xk)}k is GIW.
While there are many possible ways to construct {xk}k, an LCG of the form
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Table V. Benchmark of GIW address generation
Type Bit reversal Rate (IP/sec) State & seed
AGT – 661, 247 512 MB
LCG Bit shifts 10, 729, 920 4 bytes
Two-byte hash 21, 263, 889 4 bytes
xk = axk−1 + c is a natural choice due to its computational efficiency and need for
only a single integer of state. To establish its suitability for Theorem 1, we note
that the conditions for achieving a full period in {xk}k with an LCG are well-known
and require that a − 1 be divisible by 4 and c be odd [47]. We call the resulting
algorithm Reversed LCG (RLCG) and use it with a = 214, 013, c = 2, 531, 011, which
are well-known constants that produce an uncorrelated sequence of random variables.
The random initial seed x0 can then be used to change the scan order across multiple
runs.
To efficiently reverse the bits, we use a 2-byte hash table that flips the order
of bits in 16-bit integers. Therefore, any 32-bit IP can be processed in two memory
lookups (i.e., 26 times faster than AGT); however, the CPU cache often makes this
operation run even faster in practice. Table V benchmarks IP generation of AGT,
naive bit-shifts (32 shifts down and 32 up), and the hash-table technique. Observe
that RLCG with a hash-table runs at double the speed of bit-shifts and beats AGT
by a factor of 32, which is slightly faster than 26 predicted by the analysis above.
3.3.3 Scan Origin
While previous work has split the scan burden among m nodes to decrease total
duration [8], [10], [35], [83] or obtain multiple vantage points [35], no apparent con-
sideration has been given to the possible effect it has on the perceived politeness of the
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measurement. The main objective of a polite split in this chapter is to maintain the
GIW pattern across scanner IPs, which requires a mechanism for not only parceling
the address space to m scanning hosts without burdensome message-passing, but also
ensuring that each subnet s sees scanner IPs in a perfectly alternating and equally-
spaced fashion (e.g., IP1, IP2, IP3, IP1, IP2, IP3, . . . ).
The rationale for using all m sources to scan each s lies in the fact that IDS (both
open-source [12], [105] and commercial [44], [74]) detect scan traffic and throw alarms
in response to perceived malicious activity based on individual source IPs. Therefore,
a particular IP address sending its packets to s faster than other IPs is more readily
detected as it simply stands out from the others. The reason for maximally spacing
probes from different IPs is the same as before – reducing the overall burstiness at
remote subnets – which for large m (i.e., hundreds or thousands) may become non-
trivial. One example of an extremely impolite split is IP-sequential, which scans each
s from a single source IP at rates similar to those in Table IV (i.e., megabits per
second and thousands of pps), regardless of subnet size.
Analysis shows that GIW split does not require a new permutation; however,
individual source IPs must now return to s every mn/|s| packets (i.e., alternating
in some order with a full period m). Synchronizing m hosts using the block-split
algorithms of previous work [8], [10], [35], [83], while sustaining the GIW split is
a difficult problem. We instead introduce a new split algorithm that satisfies our
conditions and requires low overhead/state.
The intuition behind our split, which we call round-robin (RR), is to generate a
single RLCG permutation {zk} and assign target zk to host k mod m. AssumingM is
the set of scanning hosts, RR sends the initial seed x0 to every host i ∈M, its position
i, and the number of sources m. Each host then generates the entire sequence {zk}k
locally and hits target zi+jm at time (i+ jm)T/n for j = 0, 1, . . . , n/m, the simplicity
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Algorithm 1 RLCG/RR at host i ∈M
1: x0 = rand() ⊲ Set initial seed x0
2: for k = 1 to n do ⊲ Iterate through all IPs
3: ip = k mod m ⊲ Assigned source IP
4: xk = axk−1 + c ⊲ Advance LCG
5: if (ip == i) then ⊲ Our IP?
6: target = R(xk) ⊲ Reserve bits
7: if (BGP[target]==VALID) then ⊲ In BGP?
8: probe(target) ⊲ Hit destination
9: end if
10: end if
11: sleep(T/n) ⊲ Wait for next packet
12: end for
of which is demonstrated in Algorithm 1. Even with T = 24 hours, subnets are visited
so infrequently (e.g., every 337 seconds for a /24) that perfect synchronization of start
times is not necessary. Furthermore, in scanners running from a single location, all m
IPs can be aliased to the same host and RR-split can be used locally to ensure perfect
synchronization, which is the approach taken by IRLscanner later in the chapter.
From the well-known properties of LCGs [9], we immediately obtain the following
crucial result.
Theorem 2. RR-split with any GIW permutation
scans s with min(|s|,ms) sources, where
ms =
m
gcd( n
|s|
,m)
(1)
and gcd(a, b) is the greatest common divisor of (a, b).
To better understand this result, examine Fig. 13(a) that shows one example of
(1) for |s| = 65536 (i.e., a /16 target subnet). Notice that even values of m lead to
ms ≤ m/2 (triangles in the figure), which reduces the effective number of IPs seen
by each subnet at least by half. The worst choice of m is a power of two, in which
case ms = 1 regardless of m. On the other hand, odd values of m produce the ideal
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Fig. 13. GIW split and extrapolation delay.
ms = m (circles in the figure) and thus achieve a GIW split. We rely on this fact
later in Section 3.4..
3.3.4 Extrapolation
Given the goal of being able to extrapolate the number of responsive hosts and other
properties of open ports from a severely abbreviated scan (e.g., 1−10 seconds instead
of 24 hours), we next examine how the existing and proposed approaches handle this
problem. We split the allocated IANA space into three blocks (i.e., ARIN, RIPE,
and APNIC), roughly corresponding to different geographical zones, and build three
distributions of live IPs from our Internet measurements. Specifically, PMF function
pj(x3, x4) specifies the probability that IP x1.x2.x3.x4 is alive in geographical zone
j ∈ {1, 2, 3}. We then generate a Bernoulli random variable for each IP in the IANA
space and make it alive using the corresponding probability pj(x3, x4).
Using a simulation with T = 24 hours, we scan the assigned distribution of
live/dead hosts using four approaches – uniform, RLCG, IP-sequential, and RIS.
Assuming A is the true number of live hosts in the assignment and A˜(t) is an estimate
at time t, define the relative extrapolation error e(t) = |1 − A˜(t)/A|. Convergence
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Fig. 14. IRLscanner implementation.
to threshold ǫ is established at such time tǫ when estimates for all t ≥ tǫ have error
smaller than ǫ.
Fig. 13(b) plots the expected convergence delay tǫ averaged over 100 iterations.
Observe that both RLCG and uniform converge to 1% error in 10 seconds, while RIS
and IP-sequential take 11 and 16 hours, respectively. This result is easy to explain
since IP-sequential gets trapped in certain CIDR blocks for an extended period and
RIS hits the same last octet 16M times in a row. Furthermore, 0.1% error in Fig.
13(b) can be achieved in 23 minutes for both uniform and RLCG, while the other
two methods require 17+ hours. Even to arrive at 5% accuracy, which takes RLCG
less than a second, RIS requires 6 hours, which makes this method unsuitable for all
but most crude extrapolations.
3.3.5 Implementation
Fig. 14 shows the general structure of IRLscanner. IPs generated by RLCG/RR are
first checked against BGP prefixes and then delivered to the sending module, which
forms raw Ethernet frames and transmits them to a custom network driver (detailed
in [103]), which is capable of saturating a gigabit link with SYN packets (1.4Mpps)
from one Intel Pro/1000 NIC on a 2.2 GHz AMD Opteron system using only 60%
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of a single core. Through this subsystem, we are also able to intercept arbitrary
incoming/outgoing packets and suppress RSTs from the OS TCP/IP stack, which
we make use of later when profiling remote operating systems. All received packets
are saved to disk without inspection and are processed oﬄine. After completing each
scan, this framework continues to listen for incoming packets for several hours to
capture any extremely slow hosts, as well as record any back-scanning packets from
hackers and other potentially interesting entities.
3.3.6 Timeouts and Duration
Previous measurement studies [10], [82], [83] used retransmissions to the unrespon-
sive set of target hosts to minimize false negatives, which we now evaluate in light of
politeness and efficiency. Cursory inspection shows that retransmitting probes to un-
responsive hosts is the violation of the GIW pattern, which is undesirable. Combining
this with the likelihood that many false negatives in the unresponsive set are likely
to be from persistently congested links or over-burdened servers [2] with potentially
sensitive network administrators, politeness concerns suggest that retransmission is
not generally advisable.
From an efficiency standpoint, it should also be noted that the unresponsive
set accounts for 90 − 99% of S (depending on the protocol), which means that a
single timeout-based retransmission would require almost doubling the number of
sent packets. Our experiments show that retransmission not only yields a negligible
increase in found hosts (i.e., by 0.3−1.7% depending on the port and time of day), but
also introduces bias by capturing hosts that come online within the retransmission
timeout.
We next turn to the issue of when the status of an IP address can be determined,
which in related work [10], [35], [82], [83] has occurred at some timeout after the initial
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probe was sent. Considerable effort has been spent deciding on appropriate timeout
values [10], the choice of which affects the number of false negatives due to slowly
responding hosts and the overhead of keeping large amounts of state for outstanding
targets. Given that retransmissions are not required, we avoid this tradeoff entirely
by delaying the classification of IP addresses until after the scan completes.
In practice, we accomplish this by saving all packets incoming to our scanning IP
addresses to disk for later analysis. As there are many packets that are not relevant to
the scan, we note that certain information can be embedded in the packets themselves
to correlate responses with hosts scanned. This option has been used by encoding the
target IP address in ICMP ID fields [35] and DNS queries [25]. For TCP scans, we
take advantage of the sequence number field to encode the target IP, which allows us
to detect invalid and/or malicious replies. While this approach does raise concerns
about hard-disk space and I/O speed, in our experience the 25 GB required would
not be a factor for even very short scan durations (e.g., given 100 MB/s write speed
of modern drives, this volume of data requires a meager 250 seconds of disk I/O).
3.3.7 Negative Feedback
Throughout this section, we have explored and implemented several techniques to
reduce the sending rate (i.e., BGP scope reduction), minimize the burden on remote
networks (i.e., GIW), lower IDS false-alarm rates (i.e., RR-split), and avoid probing
busy servers and non-existent/firewalled hosts with repeat packets (i.e., no retrans-
mission).
In addition to technical solutions outlined above, a political strategy for reducing
complaints and dealing with their aftermath is beneficial. Our general approach in this
pursuit is to make the non-malicious purpose of our scans as transparent as possible
to those remotely investigating our traffic. This includes providing scanning IPs
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with descriptive names (i.e., indicating their research purpose) in the forward/reverse
DNS tree, as well as creation of TXT DNS records pointing to the project web-
page with instructions on how to opt out. With over 123 IPs participating in this
endeavor, special scripts have been written to manipulate IP assignment to various
NIC interfaces and modify DNS records in our authoritative server.
However, the most widely-used means of investigation is through a whois lookup
on offending IP addresses, followed by a direct email to the party listed therein. In
the event a complaint is received, our policy is to reply as quickly as possible with
an explanation of our traffic, a link to the project web-page, and an offer to blacklist
the network. Dynamic blacklisting in IRLscanner is implemented through periodic
reading of a flat file of blocked networks and simply removing them from the BGP
hash table. Under the assumption that network administrators who complain will do
so again later, blacklisted networks are maintained across scans. However, given that
no analysis was provided in prior work [25], [35], [83] to justify preemptively removing
subnets or addresses, our initial scan started with an empty blacklist.
The final issue one must also be aware of is that significant care should be taken
to avoid negatively impacting the local network, where internal stateful firewalls and
IDS are particularly vulnerable (from the load perspective) to large volumes of traffic
destined to billions of unique destinations. We have experienced a number of issues
with department and campus-wide IDS/firewall installations at our institution, which
all had to be manually bypassed for this project to proceed.
3.4. Experiments
In this section, we test our design decisions by performing several Internet-wide scans
using our high performance kernel-level network architecture [103] and present several
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novel scan methods. We defer in-depth analysis of the actual scan data to a later
paper, instead focusing on high-level observations and results.
3.4.1 Overview
As the goal of scanning is to produce the set of hosts offering a given service, each
targeted IP address must eventually be classified into one of four categories. Define
open set O to contain all hosts that responded positively to a scan packet (e.g., a
SYN-ACK to a TCP SYN), closed set C to represent IPs responding negatively using
the same protocol (e.g., a TCP RST to a SYN packet), unreachable set U to consist of
IPs that return ICMP unreachable or TTL expired errors, and dead set D to designate
hosts from which no reply was received at all. Note that excluding bogus responses
and strange firewall/NAT behavior, O ∪ C ∪ U ∪ D = S and the individual sets do
not overlap.
Through development of IRLscanner and in the course of other projects, we
have performed 20 Internet-wide scans since February 2008. To test a wide range of
possibilities and demonstrate the general feasibility of service discovery, we targeted
UDP, TCP, and ICMP protocols on both popular services (e.g., HTTP, DNS) and
those often used for nefarious purposes (e.g., SMTP, EPMAP). Table VI summarizes
our scanning activity. We initially started slowly with a 30-day scan duration from a
single source IP to gauge the feedback, then increased the sending rate over subsequent
scans until we achieved a duration of 24 hours, which is over 20 times faster than any
documented scan of which we are aware [35]. The number of source IPsm varied based
on their availability in our subnet and specific goals of the measurement, generally
ranging from 31 to 123. In comparison, the highest IP diversity in related work was
m = 25 in [10], followed by m = 8 in [35].
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3.4.2 UDP/ICMP Scans
We started with seven DNS scans due to an interest in public recursive DNS servers.
These scans produced between 14.5M and 15.2M responses in each run, which rep-
resents a 30% growth from the 10.5M found in [25] less than 9 months prior. We
discovered a stable set of 4.4M servers that responded to every DNS scan over a pe-
riod of three months, which indicates that the number of consistently available hosts
is far fewer than might be expected from the responses to a single scan.
Of further interest is the reduction in found hosts from 15.2M to 14.7M when
scan duration reduced to 24 hours in DNS3. This suggests that faster scan dura-
tions produce a lower cumulative response among the targets, which in part may be
attributed to the lower possibility of counting the same host multiple times under
different DHCP’ed IPs. To investigate whether previous scanning activity in some
immediate past influences the response rate in subsequent scans, we probed DNS on
four consecutive days in May 2008 (i.e., 96 hours of continuous scanning) and received
roughly the same number of responses in each case, which indicates that the Internet
is basically memoryless (at least at our scan rates).
Our last UDP scan was on ECHO port 7, which simply replies with a verbatim
copy of the received packet and to our knowledge has never been scanned in the
literature. We chose this port as a representative of a sensitive UDP service largely
because of its notoriety for broadcast amplification attacks [63]. Later in the chapter,
we deal with the huge volume of complaints and speculation that ensued in the
cooperative intrusion detection community, but note that even though best practice
is to disable this service, we nevertheless received replies from 321, 675 unique IP
addresses.
Our lone ICMP scan was a simple echo request [35], [83] that garnered 139M
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replies, representing a 20% gain over a similar scan performed in June 2007 [35].
3.4.3 TCP Scans
Our measurements targeted TCP with 11 scans on 3 different ports and two com-
binations of SYN/ACK flags. To our knowledge, TCP has not been scanned in the
literature with T less than three months [10] or with flags set other than SYN [10],
[35], [82], [83].
We start by describing the performed SYN scans in an increasing order of their
sensitivity. We initially scanned HTTP with a duration more than 90 times shorter
than the only previous attempt [10], discovering 30.3M hosts in July 2008 and 44.5M
in August 2009, the latter of which is a 140% increase compared to 18.5M IPs found
in 2006 [10]. The other two services we targeted with SYN scans were SMTP, which
is frequently probed by spammers searching for open relays, and EPMAP, which is
heavily scanned for network reconnaissance prior to attack [63], discovering 17M and
4.9M hosts respectively. Given the large number of Windows hosts in the Internet,
the EPMAP result seems low, which suggests that many ISPs drop traffic on port
135.
To determine the feasibility of scanning with other types of TCP packets, we
performed three measurements with ACK packets (i.e., SMTPA, EPMAPA, and
HTTPAS), which can be used not only to determine a host’s liveness (i.e., an ACK nor-
mally elicits a RST from non-firewalled hosts), but also to bypass stateless firewalls.
Both SMTPA and EPMAPA were executed concurrently with the corresponding SYN
scan (i.e., two packets were sent to each IP) in order to allow us to detect and charac-
terize firewalls (detailed analysis of results is outside the scope of this chapter). While
SMTPA returned 116M active hosts, EPMAPA produced only 68M responses, which
suggests that filtering is heavily applied on port 135 not only for SYN packets, but
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Table VII. Top 5 devices
Device Found %
Linux (2.4 or 2.6 kernel) 13.0M 32.9
Windows XP/Server 2003 6.3M 15.8
Windows Vista/7/Server 2008 5.6M 14.0
Windows Server 2003 SP2 3.5M 8.9
FreeBSD 1.5M 3.8
for ACKs as well. For HTTPAS, we scanned the entire BGP space with ACK pack-
ets, then immediately followed the resulting RST responses with a SYN packet. We
present our motivation and the results from this previously undocumented approach
in a later section.
3.4.4 Remote OS Fingerprinting
While service discovery projects usually focus on enumerating open set O, further
information about the hosts themselves is often critical to the depth and usefulness
of measurement studies [10], [25]. With the goals of resource efficiency and maximal
politeness at remote networks, in this section we focus on determining the operating
system of the remote hosts in O, which could be used to estimate the global impact
of known security vulnerabilities [68], approximate Internet-wide market share [73],
or track hosts with dynamic IP addresses [25]. The main difficulty in executing such
a study is that most existing tools [77], [122] not only trip IDS alarms and crash older
end-hosts with unusual combinations of TCP/IP flags, but also require substantial
overhead (e.g., 16 packets for Nmap) in Internet-wide use [104], [115]. It is thus not
surprising that large-scale OS profiling has not been attempted in the literature.
Instead of traditional fingerprinting methods, we utilize a single-packet technique
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called Snacktime [104], which exploits OS-dependent features in SYN-ACKs such as
the TCP window, IP time-to-live, and most importantly the length and number of
retransmissions of the SYN-ACK during TCP handshakes. While initial results on
accuracy were promising [104], [115], the non-trivial requirement that outgoing TCP
RST packets be dropped, long period needed to produce an answer (e.g., several min-
utes), and limited database (i.e., 25 signatures last updated in 2003) has previously
restricted its usefulness. Further work that is outside the scope of this chapter is
required to rigorously confirm its accuracy in the Internet, but given that we must
already send a TCP SYN packet to every host in O, modifying the Snacktime tech-
nique for use on an Internet-wide scale would result in no additional sent packets to
enumerate remote OSes.
To implement a scalable Snacktime, we take advantage of our custom network
driver to block outgoing TCP RST packets. Since IRLscanner already captures all
retransmitted TCP SYN-ACK packets, it is the perfect platform for massively paral-
lelizing the Snacktime technique. After a scan completes, we generate the retransmis-
sion delays from the packet dump, then run a custom implementation of the Snacktime
matching algorithm that gives preference to general classes of operating system in the
case of ambiguity and reduces the microsecond precision of retransmission delays to
manage random queuing delays in the Internet. To make the technique more useful,
we processed almost 7K responsive hosts at a large university to manually verify and
increase the database to more than 100 signatures, including the latest Windows ver-
sions (e.g., Vista, 7, Server 2008, Server 2003 SP2), webcams, switches, printers, and
various other devices.
We applied the modified Snacktime technique to HTTP2, which consisted of
|O| = 44.3M hosts that responded with at least one SYN-ACK. We successfully
fingerprinted 39.6M hosts, with 2.3M being excluded due to insufficient retransmis-
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Table VIII. Summary of fingerprinted devices
Device Type Found %
General purpose 32.4M 81.8
Network device 2.7M 6.8
Printer 1.8M 4.6
Networked storage 1.5M 3.7
Media 929K 2.3
Other embedded 287K 0.7
Total 39.6M
sions (i.e., none) and the remaining difference attributable to gaps in our signature
database. The top 5 profiled OSes are given in Table VII, with Linux contributing
32.9% of the total and various Windows implementations consisting of the next sev-
eral slots, which is indicative of their co-dominance in the web-server market. We
provide more detail in Table VIII, where we classified each signature into one of
six categories and calculated summary statistics. Note that general purpose (e.g.,
Linux, Windows) systems consist of nearly 82% of the total, with network devices
(e.g., switches, routers, NAT boxes), networked storage (e.g., NAS, tape drives), and
printers consisting of more than 1M devices each. The media category is comprised
mainly of webcams and presentation devices (e.g., TVs, DVRs, projectors).
To finish this section, we present in Table IX the total number of devices and
their percentage attributed to each class of OS in the general-purpose category, a
result that to our knowledge has not previously been shown in the literature on an
Internet-wide scale. Approximately half of the total consists of Microsoft OSes (5.6%
of which belong to Windows 2000 or older), which is likely due at least partially
to individuals hosting personal web-sites on their home machines. Linux hosts are
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Table IX. General purpose (GP) devices
OS Class Found % of GP
Windows 16.3M 50.2
Linux 13.0M 40.2
BSD/Unix 2.2M 6.7
Mac 862K 2.7
responsible for 40%, which combined with the various related forms of BSD (e.g.,
OpenBSD, FreeBSD), SunOS, and Unix results in nearly 47% of the total and rivals
Microsoft.
3.4.5 Service Lifetime
Another interesting property of Internet services is their average lifetime (uptime)
E[L], which is the mean duration of time a port stays active on a given IP. One tech-
nique [35] is to first estimate the CDF of lifetime L and then compute its mean E[L].
However, avoiding round-off errors and CDF tail cut-off often requires monitoring
the pool of target IPs at frequent intervals (i.e., minutes) and for extended periods
of time (i.e., days), all which contributes not only to higher bandwidth overhead, but
also to more likely aggravation of remote network administrators.
We offer an alternative method that can estimate E[L] using much lower overhead
and overall delay. Modeling each host as an alternating ON/OFF process [121], a set
K of uniformly selected live hosts exhibits a departure rate λ = |K|/E[L] hosts/sec
(a similar result follows from Little’s Theorem). Thus, by probing K twice at time
t and t + ∆, one can estimate λ as p(∆)|K|/∆, where p(∆) is the fraction of hosts
that have disappeared in this interval. Solving p(∆)|K|/∆ = |K|/E[L], we obtain
E[L] = ∆/p(∆).
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The key to this technique is to uniformly randomly select K and simultaneously
ensure maximal politeness of the scan. Leveraging the findings of Section 3.3.4 aimed
exactly at this issue, we first use RLCG to scan the Internet for ∆ time units at some
constant rate r. We then re-generate the same sequence of IPs at the same rate, but
actually send packets only to those targets that have responded in the first scan. Due
to limited space, we omit simulations confirming the accuracy of this method and
discuss only one extrapolation using port 80 and ∆ = 45 seconds. This experiment
covered 1M targets, found |K| = 23.7K live hosts, and yielded E[L] = 50 minutes
(i.e., p(∆) = 1.5%).
3.5. Analysis
While it would be ideal to scan the Internet using different techniques (e.g., IP-
sequential, uniform, GIW) and then assess the collected feedback as a measure of in-
trusiveness of each scan, certain practical limitations typically prevent one from doing
so (e.g., our network administrators have explicitly prohibited scanning activity using
certain non-optimal permutations). Thus, comparison is often only possible through
feedback analysis exposed in publications, which unfortunately is very scarce in the
existing literature. To overcome this limitation, this section introduces a number of
novel metrics related to the perceived intrusiveness of Internet-wide scans, studies
them in detail, and unveils certain simple, yet effective, techniques for reducing the
blowback.
3.5.1 Email Complaints
One of the uncertainties we encountered when initially considering a service discov-
ery project was the number of complaints to expect, particularly as they related to
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Table X. Emails and IPs excluded by service
Service Scans Emails Avg IPs excluded Avg
DNS 7 45 6.4 3.7M 530K
Echo 1 22 22 752K 752K
Ping 1 4 4 1K 1K
HTTP 7 24 3.4 459K 66K
SMTP 2 6 3 262K 131K
EPMAP 2 2 1 65K 32K
Total 20 103 5.15 5.3M 263K
serious threats or resulted in widespread blacklisting of the scanner to the point of
making Internet-wide measurements impossible. In this section, we attempt to clar-
ify the issue by detailing the complaints we received and the effect they had on our
measurements.
Table X contains a summary of email complaints broken down by service type.
Over all 20 scans, we received 103 complaints for an average of 5.15 per scan. Our
initial run (i.e., DNS1) resulted in 10 complaints and more than 2.5M IP addresses
blocked, which is nearly half the total of 5.3M blacklisted over the course of the
project. Most of this initial number came from a single large ISP asking us to block
several /16 residential networks. However, even with the initial burst removed from
the calculation, DNS scans resulted in an average of 172K blacklisted IPs per scan.
The most significant backlash we received was for the ECHO scan (UDP port 7),
which led to 22 complaints and more than 750K blocked IP addresses. In the next
section we provide an explanation for this significant increase, but note here that
UDP scans account for 65% of all complaints, while being responsible for only 40%
of the packets sent.
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Table XI. Email notices by complainant type
Source Cease FYI Total
Human Script Human Script
Individual 14 13 7 8 42
Government 6 2 6 2 16
Corporation 11 5 7 0 23
University 5 3 10 4 22
Total 36 23 30 14 103
In contrast to the experience of [35], where the authors received 30 times more
complaints for a TCP scan than ICMP pings, our TCP measurements produced a
total of 32 complaints over 11 scans, or about three per scan. This is an even more
remarkable result given that we scanned two sensitive ports, used ACK packets that
penetrate stateless firewalls, and clustered six scans in less than a month. While we
cannot explain this discrepancy, our numbers do not support the notion that TCP
scans are more invasive than the other protocols.
We next categorize the received emails in Table XI to show the severity and type
of each complaint. Out of 103 complaints, 59 were demands to cease the activity,
while the other 44 were FYI notifications about a possible virus with no expectation
that the measurement stop. The first row of the table shows that individual users
who monitor a single IP address with a personal firewall (e.g., ZoneAlarm, Norton)
represented 41% of the total complaints (i.e., 42 out of 103), which indicates that
a large portion of these emails cannot be avoided by any means. The remaining
three rows of the table represent complaints received from large network entities,
with universities being the most likely to send an FYI notification and worldwide
government entities comprising only 16% of the total complaints.
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In contrast to [25], we received only four cease demands from U.S. Federal Gov-
ernment entities, none of which were defense-related. Another point of interest is the
number of threats to pursue legal action, though of the three received none of them
turned out to be legitimate. Finally, analysis of emails generated by an automated
script suggests that a large chunk of all received complaints (i.e., 36% in our case)
are seldom reviewed by an actual human given the large amount of background scan
traffic their networks receive [78].
We now determine the impact of email complaints on the scope of subsequent
measurements (i.e., size of S after removing blacklisted networks) by studying the
progression of blacklisted IP addresses in Fig. 15, where scans are assigned numbers
in chronological order. Note that the complaints for the two simultaneous scans (i.e.,
SMTP and EPMAP) are encompassed in a single data point due to our inability to
tell whether the SYN or the ACK portion caused the complaint. Part (a) of the figure
contains the raw number of blacklisted addresses, which did not increase significantly
after we stopped scanning UDP. Part (b) shows the blocked addresses as a percentage
of BGP, where the total number of 5.3M represents only 0.25% of the current space
(the curve is non-monotonic due to the constant expansion of BGP).
3.5.2 Firewall Log Correlation
To gain a broader view of the Internet and decrease the amount of time required to
detect large-scale attacks, online collaborative systems [71], [94] have been developed
to pool data from strategically placed Internet sensors and firewall/IDS logs of various
networks. We focus on the SANS Internet Storm Center (ISC) [94] due to its relatively
large size of 500K monitored IP addresses and detailed publicly available data. An
ISC report consists of an IP address detected as a scanner, its source port, and the
target’s (IP, port) pair. These reports are often shared publicly, although certain fields
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Fig. 15. Progression of blacklisted IPs.
(e.g., destination IP) are obscured to protect the identity of subnets that submit their
logs. Given that these reports represent information about unwanted traffic, they can
be used to gain insight into how our scans are perceived by remote networks.
We examine ISC report summaries for several scans from Table VI. These sum-
maries are compiled daily for each service (e.g., HTTP) and consist of the number of
scanned targets, scanning hosts that targeted that service, and the ratio of packets
that are TCP. We are particularly interested in the first metric as all reports related
to our 24-hour scans should be contained in a single data point.
We downloaded summary data from ISC for one month surrounding a sample
of our HTTP, EPMAP, DNS, and ECHO scans (i.e., 15 days prior and after). The
result is plotted in Fig. 16, where the x-axis labels days in the 30-day window
surrounding each scan and the highlighted points represent the days our scanner was
actively probing that particular port. We happened to scan both HTTP in part (a)
and EPMAP in part (b) on days when ISC experienced roughly a third of its peak
number of daily reports (i.e., 27K compared to 80 − 90K), which is nevertheless an
huge number. The figure also shows that EPMAP clearly stands out as being scanned
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Fig. 16. ISC reports with our scans marked.
with a consistently high amount of daily traffic.
In contrast, parts (c) and (d) for DNS and ECHO show that IRLscanner spiked
report levels well above those of surrounding days. In fact, in the case of ECHO we
produced an extremely anomalous event, raising the total from almost zero to 50K.
Our activity on that port created concerns among network administrators that a new
exploit was under way and/or a virus outbreak was in progress. All this eventually
drew the attention of one of the traffic monitors at ISC, who wrote an explanatory
blog post to calm down the ISC community.
Given the large amount of background noise from many scanning sources (whose
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totals ISC also makes available) in parts (a) and (b) of Fig. 16, we conjecture that
network administrators are more likely to react only to traffic that clearly stands out
(i.e., makes its presence known by its high signal-to-noise ratio) rather than to scans
on sensitive ports. This is confirmed by the fact that attack-reconnaissance port 135
generated the least number of complaints and that the ECHO port, which inherently
represents little real threat to administrators due to the lack of hosts offering this
service and heavy firewall filtering, produced an unusually strong blowback. This
relationship where higher background scan traffic seems to imply fewer complaints
might benefit researchers considering scans on sensitive/popular ports in the future.
3.5.3 Enumerating Contributors
It is well-known [11], [100] that the contributors to ISC and other firewall log corre-
lation systems are vulnerable to losing their anonymity due to the nearly real-time
public display of firewall reports with only the destination IP address omitted. Several
techniques for correlating reports with targeted subnets (which is called contributor
enumeration) have been proposed [11]; however, they require tens of billions of pack-
ets, allow for false positives, and consume multiple days during full enumeration.
Given our high-performance scanner that is capable of locally using multiple IP
addresses, a much simpler attack preys on the source port, destination port, and
source IP address reported in detailed ISC logs, which are displayed for all scanning
hosts that ISC tracks. Probing each IP address in BGP set B with a unique com-
bination of source/destination ports and source IP eliminates the possibility of false
positives and the need to send any extra packets beyond those in B. This can be ac-
complished for the current 2.1B hosts with 128 source IPs by simply rotating through
all 64K source ports and roughly 250 destination ports, which can be hand-picked
from the most-scanned lists to minimize the likelihood of raising suspicion. However,
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by removing the source port from the public report, ISC can render this technique
largely ineffective.
3.5.4 ACK Scans
To prepare their subnet’s data for submission to ISC, many network administrators
rely on firewall log analyzers such as psad [84] to separate scan traffic from innocuous
packets dropped by the firewall. During our analysis, we discovered that many such
tools ignore ACK packets, which suggests that network administrators often do not
consider them to be particularly dangerous. To leverage this intuition, we propose
a scan technique for cases where finding the majority of hosts in open set O, while
significantly reducing IDS detection, is beneficial (e.g., for rarely scanned ports).
The first phase of the technique is a simple ACK scan to every host in B, which
effectively discovers the subset of hosts that are not heavily protected by stateful
firewalls. For every RST received, we verify that it has not been previously probed
using a hash table and then immediately send it a SYN packet to establish whether
the service is open or not. By only targeting hosts that previously responded, this
type of scan reduces the SYN footprint by 94% for HTTP. We performed a single
test measurement (HTTPAS in Table VI), which discovered 31.7M of the 44M total
responsive hosts, while requiring only 125M SYN packets to be sent. ISC data shows
only 4, 746 reports for our IPs during HTTPAS compared to 29, 869 reports collected
for HTTP2, which used the same T and m. This is significant as it amounts to an
84% decrease in the perceived intrusiveness of the scan.
3.5.5 DNS Lookups
We now turn to the last form of feedback we consider in this chapter. While whois
lookups seem to be the predominate form of reconnaissance performed by remote
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Table XII. DNS lookups on scanner source IPs
Scan Reverse Forward Req/sec Servers
HTTP2 3.03M 85.4K 36 47.8K
HTTP3 2.89M 80.1K 34 48.2K
HTTP6 2.85M 66.3K 33 49.2K
network administrators and individuals when they detect a scan, many specialized
tools augment IDS reports and firewalls logs with DNS lookups on offending IPs to
provide more information on the scanning host to the user. While for large networks
this functionality should be disabled (as it allows remote hosts to DoS the network
by loading it up with billions of useless DNS lookups), many personal firewalls and
small subnets implement some form of it.
We tested the frequency of these additional lookups by collecting all incoming
requests for each scanning IP address to our locally controlled authoritative DNS
server. To ensure that each request initiated by a remote entity contacted our name-
server (rather than was answered from a cache), we set the DNS TTL to zero for both
the reverse and forward lookups on scanner IPs/hostnames. After doing so, no RFC
compliant nameserver should maintain our records in their cache.
The result of this collection process for three HTTP scans is contained in Table
XII, which lists the number of reverse lookups for the IP addresses themselves and
forward lookups on the names returned by those queries. We made sure that these
IP addresses were not used for any other purpose but scanning and their names were
not publicized beyond the project web-site. Therefore, forward lookups are almost
certainly due to the common verification technique of determining the consistency
between the forward and the reverse response. While the number of requests slightly
declined for each subsequent scan, the last column shows that the number of unique
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servers in each dataset had the opposite trend. The decline in lookup rates can be
attributed to random noise, long-term caching at non-compliant DNS servers, and
users growing tired of looking up our IPs.
It should be noted that performing DNS queries on scanner IPs potentially reveals
the location (i.e., up to its local DNS server) of the IDS tool unless steps are taken to
increase anonymity (e.g., using a well- publicized DNS forwarding service). The three
scans in Table XII have identified 63, 596 unique DNS servers, out of which 35, 296
were present in each dataset. Further analysis of this data is deferred to future work.
3.6. Summary
In this chapter we developed a high-performance, Internet-wide service discovery
tool called IRLscanner, whose main design objectives were to maximize politeness at
remote networks, allow scanning rates that achieve coverage of the Internet in min-
utes/hours (rather than weeks/months), and significantly reduce administrator com-
plaints. Using IRLscanner and 24-hour scan durations, we performed 20 Internet-wide
experiments using 6 different protocols (i.e., DNS, HTTP, SMTP, EPMAP, ICMP and
UDP ECHO), demonstrated the usefulness of ACK scans in detecting live hosts be-
hind stateless firewalls, and undertook the first Internet-wide OS fingerprinting. In
addition, we analyzed the feedback generated (e.g., complaints, IDS alarms) and sug-
gested novel approaches for reducing the amount of blowback during similar studies.
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CHAPTER IV
MODELING WINDOW-BASED IDS AND STEALTH SCANNING
4.1. Introduction
As the Internet has grown more hostile over time [78], [108], many networks now
deploy Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) [12], [105] to deal with the constant pressure
of unsolicited traffic and attempts to exploit various vulnerabilities at end-hosts [78].
In its most general form, IDS monitors all inbound/outbound connections to detect
such activities as scanning (e.g., attempts to find open services [3], [43], [78], [107],
[117]), intrusion (e.g., malicious packets that exploit known vulnerabilities [68], [70],
[97]), anomalies (e.g., new communication patterns indicating infection [31], [50],
[106]), and DoS attacks (i.e., suspicious spikes in traffic/connection volume [51], [69]).
In conjunction with firewalls, IDS can block offending hosts and raise alarms to alert
administrators to potentially undesirable activity.
To maintain scalability [56], adapt over time, and keep state from growing to
infinity, many existing IDS tools [12], [44], [74], [84], [105] utilize window-based pro-
cessing of incoming traffic, which entails keeping per-flow statistics only for a limited
period of time and applying IDS detection algorithms to the packets accumulated
during this window. This makes the IDS detection process purely regenerative [89]
and oblivious to any attacks that span multiple windows. One activity whose de-
tection is particularly sensitive to the amount of state in each window is horizontal
scanning, which consists of probing every Internet host on a given port to see if it is
visible outside the firewall (repeating this process on multiple ports achieves vertical
scanning as well).
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To balance accuracy and false-positive rates, an IDS typically requires some min-
imum number of packets in the window before triggering an estimator or raising an
alarm. As observed in [108], a worm could utilize so-called stealthy traffic patterns to
prevent IDS from reaching this threshold, which makes such scans equally powerful
against all underlying estimators. Our main interest lies in horizontal stealth scan-
ning, where the main exposed technique [108] is to scan “very slowly,” potentially
dragging out the process over several months. However, it is unclear whether stealth
scanning is possible at faster rates, in what particular order the IP space should
be probed, and how likely existing IDS packages are to detect such approaches. To
shed light on this issue, we model window rules of two popular IDS implementations
(i.e., Snort [105] and Bro [12]), study the rates at which the existing scan techniques
[3], [41], [59], [62], [82], [83], [108] become stealthy, and explore fundamental IDS
limitations under stealth-optimal scan patterns.
While IDS avoidance in the literature commonly targets vulnerabilities of known
implementations [45], [48], [77], [85], [101] or concealment of abnormal communication
patterns [27], [110], [123], to our knowledge the inherent weaknesses of window-based
IDS have not been analyzed before.
4.1.1 Formalization
We start the chapter by establishing stealth-scan objectives and their relationship to
window-based IDS. We use the Flash-worm [108] model for the attacker and assume
that it controls m ≥ 1 source IPs (e.g., a botnet). In the first phase of the attack,
the botnet scans the entire Internet for unprotected hosts. It then infects them in the
second phase by attempting delivery of malicious payload only to vulnerable targets.
The crux of this approach is the ability of the first phase to maximize penetration of
IDS installations and remain undetected (i.e., stealthy). To understand whether this
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is possible without knowing subnet boundaries or specifics of deployed tools, we first
must expose rules for scanner operation and IDS window expiration.
We define a scan pattern X to be a combination of three algorithms – permutation
(i.e., order of probed IPs), split (i.e., partitioning of targets between m zombies), and
schedule (i.e., time instances when each IP is probed). During Internet-wide scans,
the uniform permutation [62], [82], [83], [108] is generally considered better than
IP-sequential [3], [41], [59] in terms of instantaneous load on target networks and
stealthiness; however, it is currently unknown how likely IDS is to detect either one,
what impact split/schedule have on stealth, and whether superior approaches exist.
Among the deployed IDS solutions [12], [44], [74], [84], [105], window expiration
follows two main principles, which can be inferred from product source code and
documentation. In a model we call IDS-A (e.g., Snort [105]), window expiration at
subnet s occurs every ∆s time units and resets the state of all scanning sources.
In a model we call IDS-B (e.g., Bro [12]), the window of each source i resets ∆s
time units following the last target hit by i. Due to its selective tracking of sources
that continuously scan, IDS-B performs much better than IDS-A at detecting slow
scanners.
Equipped with the formalization above, we next introduce the concept of stealth
cover time (SCT) T sX , which is the minimum scan duration T that allows a particular
Internet-wide scan pattern X to avoid detection at s. A scanner is then called stealth-
optimal (SO) if it simultaneously minimizes the SCT of all CIDR subnets under both
IDS-A/B. To examine the specific performance improvements and whether developing
a stealth-optimal algorithm is worth the effort, we first derive its expected gains over
the existing patterns and assess whether they are significant.
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4.1.2 Analysis
To gauge the relative stealth of different methods, define pattern X to be k-faster
in s than Y if T sX = T
s
Y /k, i.e., its SCT is k times smaller than Y ’s. We start the
analysis by deriving the probability that both IDS-A/B detect the commonly used
permutations in scanning (i.e., IP-sequential and uniform) under pre-permutation
[10], [77] and post-permutation [8], [35], [58], [59], [62], [83], [120], [119], [127] splits.
Results show that the number of botnet IPs m makes no difference when used with a
pre-permutation split; however, under a post-permutation split both methods become
m-faster with m IPs in every subnet s.
This suggests a simple technique that may significantly increase the stealthiness
of a botnet. In this method, each infected host that does not reside behind a NAT
uses ARP to sniff unused IPs on its subnet and alias them to its own NIC. Assuming
the number of stolen IPs is j, the scan from this host becomes not only j-faster (i.e.,
can increase the speed by a factor of j for the same level of detection), but also much
harder to map to the correct host without administrator access to ARP packets and
MAC-layer addresses.
We next derive the SCT of both IP-sequential and uniform algorithms, showing
that the latter is generally much stealthier than the former; however, we also identify
cases when the SCT of the uniform permutation scales quadratically with subnet size
and may exceed that of IP-sequential in sufficiently large networks. In fact, we show
examples where IP-sequential is stealthier than uniform against IDS-A in all networks
larger than /20 and against IDS-B in those larger than /21. Also, as expected, both
permutations find IDS-B significantly harder to avoid and require a constant-factor
slower scanning.
From this analysis, we additionally find that SO patterns not only similarly
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benefit from ARP hijacking, but are also orders of magnitude faster than uniform
under all practical conditions and can cover both IDS-A/B equally fast. In /16 subnets
and default Bro settings, stealth-optimal scanning is 1,209-faster than uniform, which
is equivalent, for example, to a reduction in scan duration T from 3.3 years to 1 day
while keeping the detection probability the same. Assuming T = 24 hours and
networks no larger than a /16, SO can avoid the open-source version of Snort [105]
using just m = 12 IPs, Bro [12] using 24 IPs, and Bro TRW [12] using 455 IPs,
assuming their respective default settings. With a 12K-node botnet, where each host
hijacks just 10 local IPs using ARP, a stealth scanner can cover the Internet in one
day and remain undetected in all /8 networks operating Snort/Bro/TRW with their
default parameters.
This observation prompts us to examine whether it is possible to achieve stealth
optimality in practice and at what cost/overhead.
4.1.3 Stealth Scanner
We next design a class of stealth-optimal algorithms and test them over the Internet.
We first show that SO patterns must incorporate not only a new permutation, but
also a different split and schedule. The general class of SO permutations contains
2n−1 unique elements, where n = 232 is the size of IP space, and requires 512 MB of
seed state to be communicated to each scanning host. Given this overhead, one may
consider these methods impractical and unthreatening for the Internet. However, we
also show that an attacker can use a subset of all SO permutations and distribute
state to each scanning host using just 12 bytes.
The overhead of actually generating these SO permutations consists of two arith-
metic operations and two RAM lookups, whose combination runs at over 20M per
second on commodity hardware. Both split and schedule are local modifications ap-
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plied by individual source IPs to the main permutation delivered to them from the
botmaster and incur very little additional cost. The new split algorithm ensures that
each subnet s sees all m source IPs in a round-robin fashion, while the new schedule
guarantees optimal scanning against IDS-B. Both consume almost no CPU unless
scanning rates are exorbitantly high.
We test the developed stealth-optimal framework in three Internet-wide HTTP
(port 80) scans using T = 24 hours and observe how SO patterns impact the gener-
ation of scanning reports at the SANS Internet Storm Center [94]. Our results show
that almost 40% of the reports can be suppressed using SO patterns aimed at IDS-B
rather than IDS-A. This not only suggests that IDS-B is actively deployed in the In-
ternet, but also unveils the optimal parameters for reducing the detection footprint.
These parameters agree with our analysis and support the proposed models.
We finish the chapter by proposing a simple, yet effective, model of IDS operation
that dynamically changes ∆s, which results in reduced effectiveness of SO scanners.
4.2. Related Work
Significant effort has been expended in the area of designing better IDS to detect
malicious behavior, which can be broadly classified into three thrusts. The first is
signature-based detection [46], [79], [90], which checks incoming packets against a
database of known exploits. The second, anomaly-based detection [31], [50], [106],
relies on deviation in network traffic from an established normal pattern. The third
approach we call pattern-based detection [43], [95], [113], which depends on inherent
qualities of scanners (e.g., excessive failed connections).
The area of IDS avoidance, which is the focus of this chapter, can be partitioned
along the same three dimensions. The most common directions for evading IDS
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involves sending malicious packets that do not match the signature database [48],
[77], [85], [101]. Public tools such as nmap [77] rely on incorrect reconstruction
of the packet by IDS (e.g., IP-level fragmentation [85], incorrect checksums, TTL
tricks [101]), as well as the ability of the attacker to hide its identity and/or packet
contents (e.g., source-address spoofing, confusing IP options and flags [85], [101], and
polymorphic worms [48] that modify the payload of every packet).
The second IDS-avoidance approach relies on concealing abnormal communica-
tions to bypass anomaly detectors [27], [110], [123]. Attackers can mimic the normal
traffic of exploited applications (e.g., matching sending rate [27] and pattern of pack-
ets sent [110]) or modify scan rates [123] to avoid appearing like a propagating worm.
The last direction, which is the topic of this chapter, works against pattern-based
detectors by leveraging the specifics of IDS algorithms and designing scan patterns
that never reach a detection threshold. We are aware of only one effort in this area, in
which [45] alternates between known alive hosts and unexplored space to manipulate
the TRW [43] detection algorithm.
4.3. Formalizing Scanning
In this section, we outline the goals of a large-scale scanner, introduce three funda-
mental elements of a scan that determine its performance, and set forth assumptions
on the various types of IDS. We then discuss stealth-optimal scans and their proper-
ties.
4.3.1 Scan Objectives
Assume F = {0, 1, . . . , n} is the IPv4 address space, where n = 232, and S is the set
of all CIDR networks. As discussed in [108], one of the most effective penetration
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Fig. 17. Illustration of permutation/split (m = 3).
models used by an attacker (i.e., the Flash worm) relies on a two-phase scan/infect
approach. The first phase scans F using m source IPs in some set M (e.g., a subset
of the attacker’s botnet) to build a list of vulnerable targets V . The second phase uses
zombie hosts in another set M′ to attempt infection of V using a new exploit (either
simultaneously or at some later time). Sets M and M′ may overlap if exposure
during the first phase does not reduce the infection performance of each IP during
the second phase.
As there is no need for newly infected hosts to scan the entire Internet, they
perform a quick scan of the local network (e.g., the corresponding BGP prefix) and
then stop. Due to the short duration of the infection phase (hours rather than weeks)
and limited local scanning, this attack is difficult to stop once it starts and infections
are hard to detect after phase two is over.
For a given budget m and fixed scan duration T , we assume the attacker’s goal
is to minimize its detection probability at each CIDR subnet s (i.e., maximize its
stealthiness) during the first phase of the attack. The problem of delivering malicious
payload is implementation/exploit-dependent and outside the scope of this chapter.
Due to the static nature of set M, we are also not concerned with sub-allocating the
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scan space dynamically to each newly infected host as commonly studied in worm
propagation [62].
4.3.2 Scan Patterns
Any Internet-wide scan pattern can be decomposed into three principle elements –
permutation, split, and schedule. The existing literature [8], [10], [35], [68], [70], [82],
[83], [97] has glanced over the first two elements, but without any formalization or
analysis. Given a list of items F , a permutation is a one-to-one mapping function
g1 : F → {1, 2, . . . , |F|} that simply shuﬄes the elements in F . We often denote
the permuted sequence by F ′ = g1(F). Permuting the IP space is highly beneficial
because it reduces the instantaneous load on target networks, increases delays between
packets entering IDS, and generally lowers the detection probability. It can also
control randomness and correlation among the destinations within each s.
We define a split as a many-to-one function g2 : F →M that assigns the elements
of list F to scanner IPs. One can view this as a partition of F into non-overlapping
lists F1, . . . ,Fm, where Fi is given to host i ∈ M. If each of Fi is an ordered subset
of F , we call this arrangement a block-split. In the context of the Internet, a pre-
permutation scanner [10], [77] first applies partitioning g2 to F and then permutes
each Fi using some algorithm g1 to produce the final assignment F ′i = g1(Fi) of
source i. A post-permutation scanner [8], [35], [58], [59], [62], [83], [119], [120], [127]
first applies permutation g1 to F and then partitions list F ′ using g2 into F ′1, . . . ,F ′m.
This is schematically shown in Fig. 17, where the pre-permutation scanner (left side)
uses a block-split, while the post-permutation one (right side) does not.
The final issue is to determine how each host i probes its target set F ′i so as
to complete the scan by a certain time T . To allow i to periodically send packets
faster or slower than its average rate ri = |F ′i |/T , define a schedule to be a many-
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to-one function g3 : F ′i → [0, T ] that decides the exact time instances at which i hits
each of its assigned targets. While all existing scanners draw elements from F ′i with a
constant inter-probe delay 1/ri, additional (bursty) patterns will be discussed shortly.
4.3.3 Window-based IDS
To understand the relationship between detectability of a scan and its probing rate
r, one first requires a model of IDS. In what follows, we formalize two window-based
detection rules that are loosely based on popular IDS packages [12], [44], [74], [105]
and firewall-log analyzers [84]. Since scalability [56] generally requires that IDS expire
state and operate in windows of finite size, other high-performance IDS designs are
also likely to fall under one of the two categories studied here.
Our first model, which we call IDS-A, stems from the rules of Snort [105] and
its commercial implementations [44], [74]. For each source IP i ∈M sending packets
into a given subnet s ∈ S protected by an IDS, define Csi (t) to be the count of unique
targets seen by the IDS from i in the interval [0, t]. Since keeping infinite history
of hosts contacted by i incurs substantial RAM/CPU overhead and fails to properly
discount outdated information, IDS-A periodically resets i’s state as illustrated in
Fig. 18. Here, random process Csi (t) increases by 1 for each new target hit by i,
returns to state 0 every ∆s time units, and absorbs in some pre-defined threshold
state as ≥ 1 that triggers an IDS alarm or some internal estimation algorithm (e.g.,
TRW [43], CBCRL [95]), which we assume always detects the scanner once invoked.
Our second model, which we call IDS-B, is derived from the techniques used by
Bro [12] and certain firewall-log analyzers [84]. In this method, Csi (t) represents the
number of unique unresponsive targets hit by i in the interval [0, t]. Unlike IDS-A,
this model expires i’s state only if it does not probe any new unresponsive targets for
∆s time units. Assuming the worst-case scenario where none of the targets respond,
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this logic can be described by Fig. 19, where the expiration timer of i resets to ∆s
upon each state transition.
For the same parameter set, IDS-B is stricter than IDS-A in the sense that any
scanner detected by the latter is always detected by the former. Similarly, a scanner
avoiding IDS-B always avoids IDS-A. However, IDS-B achieves this improvement
at the expense of maintaining a separate timer for each i and stochastically higher
overhead (i.e., longer lists of seen targets) in steady-state. Default parameters (∆s, as)
of deployed open-source and commercial IDS-A/B are summarized in Table XIII.
4.3.4 Stealth
We are now ready to formalize the detectability of a scan and its stealthiness. Let
I ⊆ S be the set of all IDS-equipped networks, where each element of I is a full CIDR
block (often written in the /x notation). Then, we have the following classification.
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Definition 1. A network s ∈ I is called size-trivial if m(as − 1) ≥ |s|, unavoidable
if as = 1, and normal otherwise.
Size-trivial subnets can be covered with fewer than as packets per source IP,
which means they pose no threat of detection if the scanner can probe them while
perfectly load-balancing between its IPs in M. In contrast, unavoidable networks
raise an alarm on the very first probe (e.g., darknets, personal firewalls) and thus
cannot be avoided in practice by any scanner. Define IST , IU , IN to be pair-wise
non-overlapping sets of respectively size-trivial, unavoidable, and normal networks in
I.
Define r = n/T to be the scanning rate. Then, for each source IP i ∈M, let
τ si = inf{t > 0 : Csi (t) = as|Csi (0) = 1} (2)
be the amount of time it takes s to detect i (i.e., the hitting time of Csi (t) onto state
as after the IDS sees the first packet from i). Let A
s
i (r) be an indicator variable
of detection event τ si < T and A
s(r) =
∑
i∈MA
s
i (r) be the number of source IPs
detected by subnet s ∈ I in [0, T ]. Then, ρs(r) = P (As(r) ≥ 1) is the probability
that network s detects the scan at rate r.
Assume X is a pattern that scans all IPs in F . Then, define the stealth-cover
time (SCT) T sX of a normal subnet s ∈ IN to be the minimum scan duration T that
allows X to avoid detection at s. Recalling that r = n/T , observe that T sX = inf{t ≥
0 : ρs(n/t) = 0}. Note that the concept of SCT applies only to normal subnets since
size-trivial networks can be scanned without detection in T sX = 0 and unavoidable
networks require T sX =∞, neither of which is helpful in establishing the performance
of scanning algorithms.
Definition 2. A scan pattern X is called k-faster in s ∈ IN than Y if it exhibits k
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Table XIII. Parameters of common IDS
Type Name ∆s (sec) as
IDS-A Snort [105] 60 5
Juniper [44] 120 50
NIKSUN [74] 300 200
IDS-B Bro [12] 600 20
Bro TRW [43] 1800 4
Psad [84] 3600 5
times smaller SCT, i.e., T sX = T
s
Y /k. It is called IP-scalable if it is m-faster in all
s ∈ IN with m source IPs than with one.
It is usually safe to assume that the scanner remains oblivious to individual IDS
parameters (∆s, as) and CIDR subnet boundaries in set I. However, from the analysis
of common IDS implementations (e.g., Bro-TRW [43] requires at least 4 samples for
its estimator), one may possess a uniform lower bound β on parameter as. In that
case, we call a scanner β-aware if 2 ≤ β ≤ as holds simultaneously for all normal
subnets s ∈ IN and no larger bound is known. If β = 2, we call the algorithm unaware
since it benefits from no additional knowledge.
Definition 3. A β-aware scan pattern X is called stealth-optimal (SO) if for both
IDS-A/B it 1) achieves ρs(r) = 0 in all size-trivial networks; and 2) minimizes the
SCT of all normal subnets, i.e.,
∀s ∈ IN : T sX = min
Y
T sY (3)
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4.3.5 Existence
To understand optimal patterns, we next derive a lower bound on minY T
s
Y in (3)
and show that there exists a local (i.e., as seen by each s) arrival pattern of packets
that achieves it under both IDS-A/B. Later in the chapter, we develop a scanner that
implements this pattern globally (i.e., simultaneously in all CIDR subnets).
Theorem 3. The SCT of s ∈ IN is lower-bounded by
min
Y
T sY ≥
|s|∆s
m(β − 1) . (4)
Proof. For a given scan duration T , the average number of probes sent from source
IP i to s per ∆s-interval is bi = |F ′i(s)|∆s/T , where F ′i(s) is the set of addresses in s
assigned to i. From the pigeonhole principle, observe that if bi is larger than β − 1,
then there will be at least one ∆s-interval with β targets. Since the scanner does not
know the actual as, it must assume that detection is avoided if and only if bi ≤ β− 1
for all i, i.e.,
max
i∈M
|F ′i(s)|∆s
T
≤ β − 1, (5)
where
∑
i∈M |F ′i(s)| = |s|. Therefore, the SCT of any method Y must be bounded
T sY ≥
maxi∈M |F ′i(s)|∆s
β − 1 ≥
|s|∆s
m(β − 1) , (6)
which leads to the desired result in (4).
To show that SO patterns exist locally, suppose each source i shapes its traffic
to s into bursts of β − 1 packets separated by an intra-IP gap
δsintra =
Tm(β − 1)
|s| . (7)
As illustrated in Fig. 20(a), this pattern initially raises target count Csi (t) to
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Fig. 20. Stealthy β-aware probing seen by s.
β−1 and then follows it up with the proportionally-stretched gap in (7). Detection is
avoided for IDS-B if and only if δsintra ≥ ∆s. As discussed earlier, IDS-B is stricter than
IDS-A, which means that the scanner also automatically avoids IDS-A. Combining
the two cases and solving δsintra ≥ ∆s for T , this pattern exhibits the same SCT for
both types of IDS
T sO =
|s|∆s
m(β − 1) , (8)
which is optimal as it equals the lower bound in (4). While the existence of global SO
patterns may not be immediately obvious, they will be shown later in the chapter.
Examining (8), notice that the optimal SCT is a linear function of subnet size
|s| and all IDS parameters, unlike the uniform permutation (studied in the next
section), whose SCT sometimes scales as |s|2. Furthermore, SO patterns are not only
IP-scalable, but also (β − 1)-faster than any unaware pattern.
4.3.6 Improvements
One drawback to the SO pattern is its inability to control the distance between probes
from different IPs, which for large m (e.g., hundreds or thousands) may lead to non-
trivial spikes in flow and packet intensity at individual subnets. Since β is usually
small (i.e., no larger than 4 from Table XIII), normal intra-burst spikes are of much
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less concern. To prevent IP-burstiness from raising suspicion, triggering DoS filters,
and potentially losing packets due to congestion, we next define a more stealthy class
of scan algorithms.
Definition 4. SO patterns that minimize the burstiness of arriving traffic at each
s ∈ S are called smooth and stealth-optimal (SSO).
As shown in Fig. 20(b), SSO maximizes the inter-IP delay between adjacent
bursts and keeps it constant at
δsinter =
T (β − 1)
|s| . (9)
Since size-trivial networks can never detect SO scanners, SSO can additionally
reduce burstiness within such networks by spacing its intra-IP probes as far as possible
(i.e., utilize unaware probing for s ∈ IST ).
Finally, the last desirable feature of a scanner is random sampling of the internal
space within each subnet s. To properly capture this, define for any list L operator bL
to retain the lower b bits of its elements. Then, for all valid permutations, the items
in bF ′ are distributed uniformly in [0, 2b− 1]; however, this sequence may be strongly
correlated and/or almost deterministic, which is highly undesirable as it attracts the
attention of administrators and tools trained to react to obvious scanning patterns.
Definition 5. SSO patterns for which bF ′ approximates an iid sequence of uniform
variables in [0, 2b−1] for all 1 ≤ b ≤ 32 are called uncorrelated, smooth, and stealth-
optimal (USSO).
4.4. Analysis of Existing Methods
Our goal in this section is to analyze two popular methods for scanning the Internet
– IP-sequential [3], [41], [59] and uniform [62], [82], [83], [108] – and compare them
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to stealth scanners defined in the previous section. We not only derive the detection
probability ρs(r) for both IDS-A/B, but also develop a unifying modeling framework
that covers both pre/post-permutation splits.
4.4.1 IP-sequential
Our first studied method, which we call IP-sequential, does not permute the IP space
(i.e., F ′ = F), uses a block-split that partitions F into m equal-size chunks, and
sends packets from each i with constant spacing δ = 1/ri = Tm/n. Note that both
pre/post permutation splits are equivalent for this method and each subnet s (smaller
in size than n/m and not falling on the boundary between adjacent source IPs) is
scanned by a single i ∈M assigned to it.
The IP-sequential permutation is guaranteed to avoid IDS-A if and only if each
source allows no more than β−1 inter-packet gaps within any interval [t, t+∆s), which
is equivalent to δ(β − 1) ≥ ∆s. For IDS-B, this condition is much more conservative
since none of the inter-packet delays δ can be smaller than ∆s. Combining the two
cases, we have the IP-sequential SCT as
T sQ =
∆sn
mζ
, where ζ =


β − 1 IDS-A
1 IDS-B
. (10)
Notice from (10) that sequential scanning is IP-scalable and (β−1)-faster against
IDS-A than IDS-B. However, unlike SO, this pattern does not automatically avoid all
size-trivial networks. Only subnets with |s| < as fall into this category and m cannot
be used to expand it. In terms of SCT performance, sequential is n(β− 1)/ζ|s| times
slower than SO in each s. Given a /16 subnet with Bro’s default β = 4, SO is
65, 536-faster than IP-sequential against IDS-A and 196, 608-faster against IDS-B.
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In terms of probing rates, IP-sequential scans each s at
max
( n
mT
,
|s|
T
)
(11)
packets per second (pps). Depending on the scan duration T , this rate may become
quite noticeable in comparison to the background traffic and may lead to easy detec-
tion. For T = 24 hours, the first term of (11) is 49.7/m Kpps, regardless of the target
subnet size. For the same T , the SO pattern’s rate is max(n/m|s|, 1) times smaller at
s. For m = 10, this ratio is 6, 553 for /16 networks (i.e., 0.76 pps) and 1.67M for /24
subnets (i.e., one packet every 337 seconds). However, if both the botnet and target
network s are large (i.e., m|s| ≈ n), the scan rate of IP-sequential might not be too
far from optimal, which is possibly one of the reasons for its widespread use in the
Internet [3].
4.4.2 Uniform Pattern
The main drawback to the sequential permutation is that it does not explore other
subnets before hitting the same s with repeat packets. Uniform scanning improves
upon this basic algorithm by spreading packets between random subsets of the In-
ternet. We call a permutation function g1 on list F uniform if the probability that
each i ∈ F moves into position j ∈ [1, |F|] is 1/|F|. All existing uniform scanners
use block-split and constant inter-packet delays δ = Tm/n.
Consider a particular subnet s with |s| IPs that need to be scanned in [0, T ].
The uniform permutation randomly scatters these |s| targets throughout a discrete
set D, which equals F ′i for pre-permutation, where i is the host scanning s, and F ′
for post-permutation. This is illustrated in Fig. 21, where the IPs in s are marked
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Fig. 21. Uniform model (m = 4, |s| = 4).
with black dots and all the remaining IPs are gray. Defining
ω =


1 pre-permutation
m post-permutation
(12)
the size of set D is |D| = ωn/m.
Assuming n≫ 1, the shuﬄe can be viewed as occurring in time rather than inside
a discrete set D. This transformation simplifies understanding of the derivations
below and does not impact any IDS detection probabilities. Specifically, imagine that
source IPs scan the Internet sequentially (rather than concurrently) as shown at the
bottom of Fig. 21. Then, the time instances when s sees probes from M can be
viewed as uniformly random in the time interval [0, ωT ].
4.4.3 Uniform Detection Probability
We start by analyzing how the uniform pattern delivers packets to individual networks
and develop a simple model for the detection probability in IDS-A. We later extend
this result to IDS-B.
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Theorem 4. For T ≫ ∆s, the probability that a normal subnet s ∈ IN with IDS-A
detects a uniform scanner is
ρsA(r) ≈ 1−
(as−1∑
j=0
(|s|
j
)
qj(1− q)|s|−j
)1/q
(13)
where q = ∆s/ωT .
Proof. From the discussion in Section 4.4.2 and Fig. 21, each address from s has
the same probability q = ∆s/ωT of falling into a given bin of size ∆s. Ignoring the
last potentially incomplete bin of each user (which we can do since ∆s ≪ T ), the
number of probes sent to s in bin [j∆s, (j + 1)∆s) ⊆ [0, ωT ] is a binomial variable
W sj ∼ B(|s|, q). Define φsbin = P (W sj ≥ as) to be the probability that s detects the
scan in a given bin j. Since
∑1/q
j=1W
s
j = |s|, the variables from different bins are
dependent; however, for large T/∆s, one can treat them as approximately iid, which
leads to
ρsA(r) ≈ 1− (1− φsbin)1/q. (14)
Substituting the CDF of W sj in (14), we get (13).
Fig. 22 compares simulations to (13) as four of the main parameters of the
model change. Numerical results indicate that (13) is accurate to within 1% as long
as T ≥ 100∆s. Part (b) shows one example where T = 10∆s is insufficiently large,
which results in some discrepancy for values of as ∈ [30, 35].
From the analysis of (13), observe that ρs(r) is a function of product ωT , which
automatically means that uniform scanning is IP-scalable against IDS-A if and only
if it uses post-permutation split. Otherwise, the detection probability stays constant
regardless of m and the scanner ends up wasting IPs without improving its stealthi-
ness.
We now turn our attention to IDS-B and its detection probability. Our first step
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Fig. 22. Comparison of post-permutation IDS-A model (13) to simulations (default
parameters |s| = 28,∆s = 60 sec, as = 4, and m = 1).
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is to understand inter-probe delays {Y sk }k seen by s fromM in our continuous model
in Fig. 21.
Theorem 5. Inter-probe delays Y s1 , . . . , Y
s
|s|−1 are identically distributed random vari-
ables with E[Y sk ] = ωT/|s| and the following CDF tail
P (Y sk ≥ y) =
(
1− y
ωT
)|s|
, 0 ≤ y ≤ ωT. (15)
Proof. First, notice that the uniform permutation is equivalent to randomly distribut-
ing |s| points on the ring of length ωT . Since there are |s| inter-probe gaps on the
ring, their mean is simply E[Y sk ] = ωT/|s|. Second, the probability that a given
address from s falls in the interval [t, t+ y) ⊆ [0, ωT ] is y/ωT . Then, the probability
that none of the addresses from s land into [t, t+y) is P (Y sk ≥ y) = (1−y/ωT )|s|.
We omit simulations showing that (15) is very accurate. Instead, we define
χs = P (Y
s
k < ∆s) and proceed to the next result.
Theorem 6. For (|s| − as)(1− χs)/m→∞, the probability that IDS-B at a normal
subnet s ∈ IN detects a uniform scanner is asymptotically
ρsB(r) ≈ 1− e−(|s|−as+1)(1−χs)χ
as−1
s . (16)
Proof. Define Jsk to be an indicator variable of event Y
s
k < ∆s. Then, P (J
s
k = 1) =
1 − P (Jsk = 0) = χs. Since IDS-B needs as − 1 consecutive 1s in set {Jsk}k to arrive
into state as, define
Xsk =


1 Jsk = J
s
k+1 = . . . = J
s
k+as−2
= 1
0 otherwise
(17)
to be an indicator of a detection event occurring at time k + as − 2. Denoting by
l = |s|−as+1 the size of set {Xsk}k, we have that Xs =
∑l
k=1X
s
k is the total number
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of detections in [0, ωT ] and ρs(r) = P (Xs ≥ 1).
Before deriving this probability, note that we need to analyze only those consec-
utive runs of 1s in sequence {Jsk}k that follow a 0 and start no later than position l.
Indeed, supposing that this set contains Z zeroes, Xs is non-zero if and only if any of
the Z runs of 1s that immediately follow a zero has length at least as − 1. All other
runs provide redundant information and can be removed from consideration.
Define Vj to be the value of X
s
k following the j-th zero in set {Jsk}lk=1. We then
obtain
Xs =
Z∑
j=1
Vj. (18)
From the Chen-Stein theorem [4] and treating set {Jsk}k as approximately iid,
variable Xs converges to the Poisson distribution with rate λ = E[Xs] = E[Z]E[V s1 ]
as E[Z] → ∞. Noticing that E[Z] = l(1 − χs) and E[V s1 ] = χas−1s , we get λ =
l(1− χs)χas−1s , which immediately leads to ρs(r) ≈ 1− e−λ in (16).
We should make three observations about this derivation. First, for small |s| and
large as, the dependency in set {Jsk}k may be strong enough for ρs(r) to disagree with
the model (which arises because
∑
k Y
s
k ≤ ωT and set {Y sk }k is not iid); however,
in the limit (16) is exact. Second, we have replaced Z with its expectation in the
Chen-Stein method; however, simple but tedious math shows that E[eaZ ] for binomial
Z behaves almost the same as eaE[Z] as E[Z]→∞. Finally, although each delay Y sk
may span several source IPs, condition (|s| − as)(1 − χs)/m → ∞ ensures that each
IP gets enough 0s in {Jsk}k to invoke the Chen-Stein theorem and keeps the overall
result asymptotically accurate.
Fig. 23 compares simulations to (16) under the same default conditions as in
Fig. 22. Results show that T,m, and |s| do not influence the accuracy of the model
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Fig. 23. Comparison of post-permutation IDS-B model (16) to simulations (default
parameters |s| = 28,∆s = 60 sec, as = 4, and m = 1).
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if threshold as is small compared to |s| (i.e., the error is below 0.1% for as = 4
and subnet sizes as small as 28). However, significantly larger as create too much
dependency among consecutive delays {Y sk }k leading up to detection and result in a
more serious mismatch with the model (shown in part (b) of the figure). Increasing
|s| or lowering as fixes the problem.
As with IDS-A, uniform scanners are IP-scalable against IDS-B if and only if
they use post-permutation split, which can be inferred from the ωT term in (15).
Since our analysis shows that pre-permutation carries no benefit, we omit its further
discussion in the rest of the chapter.
4.4.4 Uniform Cover Time
We next examine the time needed for the uniform permutation to cover a particular
subnet. In order to determine this metric, we first relax the definition of SCT since
uniform scanners can never achieve ρs(r) = 0 with finite T . For a patternX, define the
ǫ-SCT T sX(ǫ) of a normal subnet s ∈ IN to be the minimum duration T in whichX can
reduce the detection probability at s below ǫ, i.e., T sX(ǫ) = inf{t ≥ 0 : ρs(n/t) ≤ ǫ}.
We similarly relax the definition of k-faster and IP-scalable to operate in terms of
ǫ-SCT instead of SCT.
This leads to the following approximation.
Theorem 7. Define c = 1/(β − 1). Then, for ǫ → 0 and |s| ≫ β, the ǫ-SCT of a
β-aware uniform permutation is asymptotically
T sU(ǫ) ≈
α|s|∆s
ω


eη1(β!)−c IDS-A
eη2η−13 IDS-B
(19)
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where
α =
( |s|
− log(1− ǫ)
)c
, η1 = W (−c(β!)c/α), (20)
η2 = W (−c/α), η3 =
∞∑
j=0
(αeη2)−j
j + 1
, (21)
and W (.) is Lambert’s function.
Proof. Since ρs(r) = ǫ is asymptotically small, one can make a number of approxi-
mations that greatly simplify inversion of (13) and (16). For small x, we use Taylor
expansions (1− x)y ≈ e−xy, 1− e−x ≈ x, and log(1− x) ≈ −x. We also neglect β in
comparison to |s|, i.e., |s| − β ≈ |s|.
Without a-priori knowledge of as, a uniform scanner must assume that counter
Csi (t) reaching β triggers detection for both IDS-A/B. This means (13) and (16) must
undergo inversion with as replaced by β. For IDS-A and constant |s|, observe that
ǫ→ 0 implies q → 0 and the leading term of φsbin is
φsbin ≈
(|s|
β
)
qβ(1− q)|s| ≈
(|s|
β
)
eβ log q−|s|q. (22)
Recalling that ρsA(r) ≈ 1− (1− φsbin)1/q, we have
log(1− ǫ) ≈ log(1− φ
s
bin)
q
≈ −φ
s
bin
q
. (23)
Using (22) in (23) and taking log of both sides, we get
log
(−β! log(1− ǫ)
|s|β
)
≈ (β − 1) log q − |s|q. (24)
This equation is of the general form ay+ b log y = c, where y = q, whose solution
using Lambert’s W (.) function is given by
y = exp
[
−W
(aec/b
b
)
+
c
b
]
. (25)
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Fig. 24. Relative error between the binary-search SCT and its closed-form approxima-
tions (|s| = 216,∆s = 60 sec, m = 1).
Applying this result to (24) and recalling that q = ∆s/ωT , we arrive at the first
line of (19).
For IDS-B, observe that (16) can be written as
− log(1− ǫ) ≈ |s|(1− χs)χβ−1s . (26)
Since χs → 0, we have log(1− χs) ≈ −χs and
log
(− log(1− ǫ)
|s|
)
≈ −χs + (β − 1) logχs, (27)
which again has shape ay + b log y = c for y = χs. Solving (27), we get χs = e
−η2/α.
Expanding χs = 1− (1− q)|s| and applying log to both sides, we have
log(1− e−η2
α
)
|s| ≈ log(1− q) ≈ −q =
−∆
ωT
. (28)
Substituting − log(1 − z) = z(1 + z/2 + z2/3 + . . .) with z = e−η2/α into (28),
we end up with the second line of (19).
Fig. 24 shows the relative error between approximations (19) and the corre-
107
sponding ǫ-SCT found using binary search on models (13), (16) as ǫ→ 0. For β = 2,
the latter is so close to the former that their relative difference is initially less than
10−5, which falls below Matlab’s default precision for binary search and explains why
it does not improve as ǫ→ 0. The other two curves in each subfigure show monotonic
decay as a function of ǫ, with the IDS-B model generally agreeing better with the
original than IDS-A. This arises from the extremely crude approximation in Theo-
rem 7 to the binomial distribution in (13). For larger β, the error is generally more
pronounced and decays slower since the magnitude of the omitted terms is higher;
however, in all cases in the figure it stays below 2.4% (including ǫ = 0.5).
4.4.5 Discussion
We finish this section by analyzing the relative performance of the various algorithms.
As ǫ → 0, the numerous constants in (19) disappear. Specifically, α becomes large
and η1 → 0, η2 → 0, η3 → 1, which leads to
T sU(ǫ) ≈
|s|1+c∆s
ωγǫc
, where γ =


(β!)c IDS-A
1 IDS-B
.
First, observe that uniform is SCT-slower against IDS-B by a factor of (β!)c than
against IDS-A. This term is always no smaller than 2 and is approximately (β/e)1+c
for β ≫ 1. While for IP-sequential this ratio is always β − 1 and for SO it is 1, the
uniform permutation splits these two extremes somewhere in the middle as β →∞.
Second, notice that T sU(ǫ) is proportional to |s|1+c, which may scale quite aggres-
sively as |s| becomes large (e.g., quadratically for β = 2). Because of this, uniform
becomes SCT-slower than IP-sequential for any s with |s| > n0, where
n0 =
(nγǫc
ζ
)β−1
β
, (29)
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which has not been previously documented and is quite counter-intuitive.
For β = 2, this translates into n0 =
√
γnǫ. Assuming the desired detection prob-
ability ǫ = 10−3 (i.e., on average, one in 1, 000 subnets detects the scan), IP-sequential
is faster against IDS-A on any network with more than 2, 930 IPs and against IDS-B
with more than 2, 072 IPs (i.e., these roughly map to /20 and /21 subnets). However,
as β increases, (29) quickly rises as well. For β = 4, the corresponding thresholds
are 14.1M (IDS-A) and 9.9M (IDS-B), which are large enough (i.e., /8 or bigger) to
conclude that uniform is superior to IP-sequential in all but a handful of cases. Its
average probing rate |s|/T of each s is also much better than IP-sequential’s.
Third, even though for some scan patterns two sets of IDS-A parameters are
equivalent if ratio ∆s/(as−1) (i.e., the average allowed gap between packets) remains
constant, this is not the case against the uniform permutation. Lowering ∆s while
keeping the ratio constant actually increases the uniform cover time and makes IDS-
A perform better at detecting the scanner. Thus, for example, combination (15, 2) is
much stricter than Snort’s default (60, 5) even though both allow on average 1 scan
packet per 15-second interval.
Our final observation is that the stealth-optimal pattern is
π(ǫ) =
T sU(ǫ)
T sO
=
|s|c(β − 1)
γǫc
(30)
times SCT-faster than uniform. This ratio is plotted in Fig. 25 for two subnet sizes.
In both subfigures, (30) for IDS-A starts at |s|/2ǫ for β = 2 and converges toward e
as β → ∞. For IDS-B, it starts at double the IDS-A value and never drops below
its global minimum π0 = e log(|s|/ǫ) achieved at β0 = π0/e + 1. This shows that
regardless of β, the SO pattern is at least π0-faster against IDS-B than uniform. For
the examples in the figure, this is 33.8 and 48.9, respectively.
In summary, this section has shown that the uniform pattern performs signif-
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Fig. 25. Ratio π(ǫ) for ǫ = 10−3.
icantly worse than might have been expected, especially when β is small. For the
default β = 4 and ǫ = 10−3 used in this section, SO scanners in /16 subnets are 419-
faster than uniform when facing IDS-A and 1,209-faster when facing IDS-B, which
leads to our next topic of how to leverage these findings in practice and achieve
SCT-optimality globally.
4.5. Stealth Scanning
To show that a stealth-optimal scanner is possible and test it in practice, this section
develops permutation, split, and scheduling algorithms for achieving USSO simulta-
neously in all CIDR subnets. To keep track of the various pieces and how they map
to our earlier definitions, assume SO(β,m) is the set of stealth-optimal patterns for
some β ≥ 2 and m ≥ 1. We define sets SSO(β,m) and USSO(β,m) similarly.
4.5.1 Permutation
Our first goal is to tackle the simplest case SO(2, 1). We start by formulating a
condition that is simpler to satisfy, show its equivalence to SO(2, 1), and then develop
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methods that achieve it.
Definition 6. For s ∈ S, any permutation that returns to s with a period of n/|s|
is called IP-wide at s. A permutation that achieves this for all s is called globally
IP-wide (GIW).
It is not difficult to show that a permutation covers every s in time |s|∆s if and
only if it is GIW. Since this SCT is optimal for β = 2 and m = 1, we obtain that set
GIW = SO(2, 1). To implement GIW, visualize permutation F ′ as a binary tree of
depth 32, where target IPs reside in leaves and all edges are labeled with 0/1 bits.
A permutation can be viewed as a process that traverses the tree and accumulates
individual bits along the edges into the next IP. Decisions to move left (L) or right
(R) at internal gateways v depend on their state θv, which must be altered each time
to ensure that all generated IPs are unique. If the state of each visited node is flipped
during traversal, we call this structure an alternating gateway tree (AGT). Fig. 26(a)
shows the bottom four levels of some random AGT whose next generated IP address
ends with bits 011 and the other after that with 101.
Since balanced binary trees have well-defined rules for calculating the offset of
each internal node, AGTs do not require storing child pointers. Thus, their RAM
overhead is (n − 1)/8 = 512 MB needed to store tuple (θ1, . . . , θn−1) and their com-
putational complexity is 26 memory reads/writes (i.e., 52 total) per generated IP
(assuming depth-31 traversal and 64-bit lookups that yield the first 5 levels of the
tree in one RAM access).
Theorem 8. A permutation is SO(2, 1) if and only if it can be realized by an AGT.
Furthermore, |SO(2, 1)| = 2n−1.
Proof. For the first part, induction on the depth of each subnet in AGT shows that
it is equivalent to GIW, which in turn is equivalent to SO(2, 1). For the second part,
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notice that the number of unique AGT permutations is simply the number of unique
seeds (θ1, . . . , θn−1), which trivially equals 2
n−1.
Note that 2n−1 is smaller than the total number of permutations of F (i.e., n!),
but nevertheless enormous (i.e., 101,292,913,986). In practice, one does not require this
much diversity in their ability to scan the IP space and other algorithms with fewer
unique permutations are quite sufficient. One reason to seek alternatives is that AGT
requires huge overhead during checkpointing and transmission of state in distributed
implementations. Another reason is that AGT’s CPU complexity is quite high and
leaves room for improvement, which we achieve next.
Recalling that bx is the lower b bits of x, define bx¯ to be bx with its bits reversed
and consider our next result.
Theorem 9. Given a sequence of integers {xk}nk=1, suppose {bxk}k have full periods
for all b = 1, 2, . . . , 32. Then, permutation {32x¯k}k is GIW.
Proof. Assume that s has depth b in the AGT (i.e., n/|s| = 2b) and observe that GIW
patterns must visit all remaining 2b − 1 subnets at depth b before returning to s. In
practice, this means that the permutation must exhibit a full period in the upper
b bits. Since this holds for all s, the full period must be maintained at all depths
1 ≤ b ≤ 32. Reversing the bits in each IP, we replace this condition with a much
simpler one – the full period must hold in the lower b bits, which is equivalent to the
statement of the theorem.
While complex dependency between the elements of {xk}k is possible, we limit
ourselves to Markovian sequences xk = h(xk−1). This keeps scanner overhead minimal
– both state xk and seed x0 consist of one integer and the CPU complexity is that
of computing h(.) and reversing the bits. To maximize the speed of generating the
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Fig. 26. Illustration of AGT and SSO(2, 2).
permutation, one natural choice is to consider only linear h(.), which leads us to the
concept of an LCG (linear congruential generator). Recall that LCGs are recurrences
xk = axk−1 + c, whose well-known properties yield the following.
Theorem 10. An LCG {xk}k satisfies Theorem 9 if and only if a− 1 is divisible by
4 and c is odd.
We call the resulting permutation Reversed LCG (RLCG) and note thatRLCG ⊆
GIW . To efficiently reverse the bits, one can use a 2-byte hash table that flips the
order of bits in 16-bit integers. Therefore, any 32-bit IP can be processed in two
memory lookups (i.e., 26 times faster than AGT); however, the CPU cache often
makes this operation run even faster in practice.
4.5.2 Split
We now augment GIW with a novel split algorithm that puts it into set SSO(2,m).
While block-split has been frequently used in related work, its ability to regulate
the burstiness of different source IPs at each s is lacking. Indeed, block-split can be
visualized as m AGTs assigned to m scanner hosts, where each AGT starts with a
different seed. However, synchronizing the order and schedule of m trees to ensure
perfectly non-bursty operation at each s is a challenging problem.
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To overcome this setback, we introduce a new partitioning scheme called round-
robin (RR) that assigns the j-th element of F ′ to host j mod m. The corresponding
scheduler in each host i ∈ M needs to know the main seed x0, its own position i,
and the total number of scanner IPs m. It then generates the entire sequence {zk}k
locally and hits target zi+jm at time (i + jm)T/n for j = 0, 1, . . . , n/m. Note that
perfect synchronization of start times is unnecessary as inter-IP delays at each s are
quite large (e.g., 337 seconds at /24 and 1.31 seconds at /16 for T = 24 hours).
Since there is only one AGT and inter-packet delays are fixed, RR-split ensures
that any GIW permutation that visits each s /∈ IST with all m IPs is SSO(2,m). We
next examine what values of m ≥ 2 guarantee this condition.
Theorem 11. RR-split with any GIW permutation scans each s with min(|s|,ms)
sources, where
ms =
m
gcd( n
|s|
,m)
(31)
and gcd(a, b) is the greatest common divisor of (a, b).
Proof. Examine permutation {zk}k and assume it is GIW. For a given subnet s,
observe that its IPs appear in this list with a period n/|s|, which follows from the
definition of GIW. Assuming wj ∈M is the j-th IP that hits s, we have
wj =
(
wj−1 +
n
|s|
)
mod m, j = 1, 2, . . . (32)
This recurrence is an additive-only LCG whose period [9] is given by (31), which
means that the number of sources scanning s is the smaller of its size and ms.
Defining N to be the set of natural numbers, this observation leads to the follow-
ing.
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Theorem 12. RR-split with any GIW permutation is SSO for odd m, i.e., ∀k ∈ N :
GIW/RR ⊆ SSO(2, 2k−1). Furthermore, set SSO(β, 2k) is empty for any k, β ∈ N.
Proof. Since odd m produces ms = m and even m leads to ms ≤ m/2, the first part
of this theorem follows from Theorem 11 and the discussion immediately preceding
it.
The second part we prove by contradiction using β = m = 2 (generalization to
larger values is straightforward and omitted for brevity). Suppose s sees an equally
spaced SSO(2, 2) sequence of packets from two alternating source IPs as shown on
top of Fig. 26(b). Without loss of generality, assume the first packet that arrives to s
is destined to its left child, whose SSO(2, 2) pattern is also drawn in the figure right
below that of s. Now notice that this combination of patterns is mutually exclusive,
which means that SSO(2, 2) cannot be achieved globally by any algorithm.
While GIW permutations coupled with even m and block-split keep the method
in set SO(2,m), such choices of m are quite disastrous with RR-split as they at least
double the pattern’s SCT and make it no longer optimally stealthy. Selecting m as
a power of 2 is the worst choice of all such options as it produces ms = 1 for all s
smaller than n/m.
4.5.3 Schedule
We now build upon GIW/RR to achieve SSO(β, 2k−1) for any β ≥ 2 and k ∈ N. We
first explain this algorithm using the AGT and then transform it to the RLCG. Define
d = 32−⌊log2(m(β − 1))⌋ to be the depth at which subnets become size-trivial. The
main challenge in achieving SSO(β,m) is to send β − 1 back-to-back probes to each
s above level d, but then spread out and use unaware probing below d. Using AGT,
this can be accomplished by traversing the tree β − 2 times and flipping gateways
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Algorithm 2 SSO(β,m) at each source IP
1: d = 32− ⌊log2(m(β − 1))⌋ ⊲ Size-trivial depth
2: start = rand() ⊲ Initial seed
3: totalB = 0 ⊲ Total bursts generated
4: while start != EOS do
5: for j = 0 to β − 2 do
6: lcg[j].Init(start) ⊲ Set the seed
7: lcg[j].Skip(j2d) ⊲ Jump forward
8: end for
9: for k = 1 to 2d do ⊲ Iterate through 2d bursts
10: ip = totalB mod m ⊲ Assigned source IP
11: totalB++ ⊲ Next burst
12: for j = 0 to β − 2 do
13: x = lcg[j].Next() ⊲ Advance LCG
14: if (x != EOS) AND (ip is ours) then
15: y = ReverseBits(x)
16: if y is valid then
17: probe(y) ⊲ Hit destination
18: end if
19: end if
20: end for
21: Sleep(T (β − 1)/n) ⊲ Wait for next burst
22: end for
23: start = lcg[β − 2].Current() ⊲ Get current state
24: end while
only at depth no smaller than d. The last (β − 1)-st traversal flips all 32 gateways
along the path to ensure that the next burst proceeds according to GIW.
The above algorithm can be implemented using β−1 RLCGs maintained by each
source IP. Specifically, assume that the main RLCG is in position k in its permutation
{zk}k and that the scanner needs to generate the next β − 1 targets y0, . . . , yβ−2 in
a burst. The first target y0 is simply zk. Since the remaining β − 2 destinations do
not change the top d levels of the tree, they can be found in the permutation where
{zk}k returns to the same subnet at level d. This is equivalent to skipping forward
by 2d elements each time. This leads to
yj = zk+j2d , j = 0, 1, . . . , β − 2. (33)
To avoid having to re-generate the entire sequence for each burst, the scanner
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operates with β − 1 LCGs, each pointing to a different part of the original sequence
as shown in Lines 6-7 of Algorithm 2. After an LCG wraps back to the original seed,
it returns a special EOS (end of sequence) IP address. Algorithm 2 applies RR-split
at the burst rather than packet level in Lines 9-20 and the LCGs are advanced for
every packet in a burst (transmitted or not) in Line 13. Our last note is that target
y in Line 16 may be invalid if it falls outside the scanned space (e.g., IANA-allocated
IP blocks).
4.5.4 Correlation
Our last step is to check RLCG for correlation and determine whether its targets are
sufficiently randomized. With a properly designed LCG, sequence {xk}k is uniformly
random and uncorrelated, with the exception of having full periods in all lower b
bits. It then follows that its bit-reversed version {zk}k is also uniformly random and
uncorrelated, with the exception of having full periods in all upper b bits. Thus, it
could be argued that among all GIW sequences, RLCG is as uncorrelated as one can
expect to achieve. One common test for correlation in random number generators is
to examine adjacent pairs (zk, zk+1) of elements in B(b) = bF ′ and plot them on a
2D plane. Generally, the closer the number of unique points on the plot, which we
call diversity, to 22b and the quicker this is achieved, the better the sequence. For
example, IP-sequential’s set B(b) consists of n/2b repeated patterns of 2b numbers
each, i.e., {0, 1, 2, . . . , 0, 1, 2, . . .}. The corresponding IP-sequential plot is a straight
line with diversity 2b as shown in Fig. 27(a).
As this chapter was being written, we became aware of another such pattern [35],
which we call reverse IP-sequential (RIS). The recurrence of this approach is xk =
xk−1 + 1 and the permutation is given by zk = (32x¯k) XOR Q, where Q is some con-
stant. While this pattern is GIW, its intra/inter-subnet targets are far from random.
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Fig. 27. Correlation in B(8).
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Its set B(b) consists of 2b runs of n/2b constants, i.e., {x1, x1, x1, . . . , x2, x2, x2, . . .},
whose diversity is 2b+1. In practice, this means that the scanner hits the same target
in all /(32 − b) networks before moving on to another address. The corresponding
correlation plot is shown in Fig. 27(b).
In contrast, the uniform permutation in part (c) of the figure exhibits a much
more random pattern and diversity 9, 231 in the first 10K elements of B(b). We do not
plot more points since it clutters the graph, but note that diversity rises to 64, 841
in the first 300K elements of B(b). Part (d) of the figure shows that RLCG with
carefully chosen parameters (e.g., a = 214, 013 and c = 2, 531, 011) also covers the
entire 2D plane without much bias and numerical results place its diversity at 9, 235
among the same 10K points (for the larger sample, it is 64, 861). Additional tests
(omitted for brevity) using the distribution of zk+1−zk, the autocorrelation function,
and larger b confirm that RLCG satisfies the randomness definition of USSO.
4.5.5 Vertical Scans
USSO patterns can be extended to probe multiple ports at little additional cost.
Assume that an attacker needs to scan the entire Internet on K unique ports. We
use the general defense mechanism of Snort to outline how this could be done. One
component of Snort, discussed earlier in the chapter, monitors horizontal scans by
counting the number of local IPs contacted by each remote host. Another (inde-
pendent) component counts how many ports on each internal IP have been hit from
external sources in the same window ∆s. Once this counter reaches some threshold
P , Snort detects a vertical port-scan.
To bypass both components simultaneously, the idea is to modify USSO to hit
each target yj in (33) on exactly P − 1 unique ports. If a given scan pattern requires
time T in one horizontal scan to avoid detection, the hybrid method above achieves
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the same detection footprint and covers K ports in ⌈KT/(P − 1)⌉ time units, which
is a significant improvement over performing K full scans.
4.6. Experiments
In this section, we build a scanner based on USSO patterns and perform several
Internet-wide scans to study detection rates at remote networks as β changes.
4.6.1 Methodology
Testing open-source Snort [105] and Bro [12] in our lab has confirmed the validity
of the IDS model proposed in this chapter and showed that stealth-optimal scan-
ning indeed bypassed both systems as long as target counter Csi (t) was never allowed
to reach its threshold as. We have also validated that β-aware scanning, first in-
troduced in this chapter, performed significantly better against Bro than unaware
scanning. While these results are encouraging, it is unclear whether β-aware pat-
terns are stealthier in the actual Internet and how much IDS-B has been deployed.
To answer these questions, one requires a fast Internet scanner and ability to verify
detection rates at remote networks.
To address the first issue, we designed a high-performance scanner that uses raw
IP packets (TCP SYN, ICMP, or UDP) to cover the Internet using USSO. While
details of our implementation are presented in the last chapter, it should be noted
that to reduce synchronization complexity and decrease cost we alias the m scanning
IPs to one host and probe only the BGP-routable space (i.e., 2.11B destinations).
Using T = 24 hours and TCP SYN packets, this amounts to approximately 16 Mbps
of traffic (including MAC-layer overhead).
The second issue, however, is more challenging since verification of detection by
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remote systems is complicated by our lack of knowledge about the location of IDS,
the size and boundaries of the networks they protect, customization of parameters
∆s and as, and most importantly lack of access to remote alert logs. Fortunately,
certain network administrators participate in online collaborative systems [71], [94],
whereby they submit firewall and IDS logs for aggregation and public consumption in
an effort to reduce the time necessary to detect distributed scans or large-scale worm
attacks.
For the SANS Internet Storm Center (ISC) [94] that we focus on in this chapter,
network administrators preprocess their logs and submit packet headers that have
been deemed suspicious by either their IDS or firewall log analyzer [84]. Reports
compiled against our IPs and posted by ISC allow us to determine the exact number
of alarms/reports raised against a particular scan.
4.6.2 Results
We performed three tests in August 2009, each employing USSO and consisting of a
full Internet-wide HTTP SYN scan. We chose TCP as attackers are more likely to
target TCP services in the Internet and because of the evidence in [25], [35] suggesting
that administrators are more sensitive to TCP than other protocols (in fact, [35] notes
that TCP scans are 30 times more likely to receive complaints than ICMP scans). We
use T = 24 hours, which is 90 times faster than any prior Internet-wide TCP scan in
the literature [10], and m = 61 IPs available in our subnet.
The first scan (i.e., HTTP1) establishes a baseline for comparison and uses the
unaware pattern (i.e., β = 2). From Table XIV, observe that HTTP1 attracts a
combined total of 29K reports for all m IP addresses. Since all three scans run at
the same average rate per IP, they should result in the same amount of ISC activity,
unless IDS-B devices exist among ISC contributors. Since the lowest known detection
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Table XIV. ISC reports
Scan T m β Reports Hosts Found
HTTP1 24h 61 2 29, 869 44.3M
HTTP2 24h 61 4 18, 470 44.0M
HTTP3 24h 61 5 23, 969 44.5M
threshold for IDS-B is 4 (see Table XIII), we skip β = 3 and directly test in HTTP2
the impact of β = 4. This leads to a 38% reduction in the number of reports, which
confirms that IDS-B does in fact exist in the Internet and is responsible for a large
fraction of overall detection.
We finish our evaluation by increasing β to 5 in HTTP3, which results in 5.5K
additional alarms compared to HTTP2. The only explanation for this increase is
IDS-B with as = 4, which gets tripped by our scanner with β = 5 but not β = 4.
It can then be concluded that almost half of 11.4K IDS-B reports in the table are
generated from networks with as = 4, coincidentally the default value in Bro. The
remaining 5.9K IDS-B alarms in the table come from networks with as ≥ 5, whose
less-prevalent existence was anticipated given the values in Table XIII.
It should also be noted that the majority of the 18K reports in HTTP2 are likely
from unavoidable networks and those with extreme combinations (∆s, as), such as
those of Psad and TRW in Table XIII. The total number of email complaints we
received over these three scans was 11, none of which were generated by automated
tools. In fact, most of these came from end-users relaying messages from their personal
firewalls (such as ZoneAlarm and Norton).
All three scans find approximately the same number of alive web servers, which
shows that parameter β in the range 2− 5 does not have much impact on the ability
of a scanner to find open services in the current Internet.
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Table XV. Comparison of RAM Usage
Juniper Bro
Method as ∆s RAM as ∆s RAM
IDS-A 50 120s 247 KB 20 600s 514 KB
IDS-B 50 120s 305 KB 20 600s 649 KB
IDS-C 50 2.4s 78 KB 20 31.5s 202 KB
4.7. Defense
Observe that SO leverages the fact that it costs nothing for the scanner to raise the
counter Csi (t) to as−1 and then wait for ∆s units before sending another burst. This
allows it to scan both IDS-A/B at an average rate of (as − 1)/∆s packets per second
(pps), which contributes to its optimal stealth cover time across the entire Internet
(i.e., full scans finish quicker).
To discourage such exploits, we propose a new model called IDS-C that linearly
increases the timeout duration based on the current state of counter Csi (t), as shown
in Fig. 28. This modification allows IDS-C to detect all scanners with long-term rates
faster than 1/∆s pps, even if they utilize SO. In practice, this means that IDS-C can
lower its interval ∆s by a factor of as − 1 while offering the same stealth protection
against SO as IDS-A/B. This in turn leads to smaller RAM overhead since entries in
the table expire quicker and unique-target lists are shorter.
To verify these conclusions, we perform a simulation using CAIDA’s 1-hour trace
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with 9.6M flows and 117M packets from an OC48 link [19]. We record all transitions
made by the three types of IDS in response to incoming traffic to a popular /16 target
subnet, as well as the steady-state amount of RAM being used by each algorithm.
For this comparison, we utilize Juniper’s and Bro’s default IDS settings from Table
XIII as examples of low and high alarm rates (i.e., 3/hour and 50/hour, respectively).
Table XV shows that the typical savings in terms of RAM for IDS-C in comparison
to the other two methods amounts to 60 − 75%. Since the list of targets tracked by
IDS for each source IP is smaller, the CPU overhead needed to verify that incoming
packets belong to an existing target is also lower.
4.8. Implications
This chapter investigated a potentially sensitive issue of avoiding IDS and dissected
the algorithms of currently deployed window-based tools. While our interest is purely
to propose a novel model of IDS operation and understand its fundamental limitations,
one concern might be that attackers could benefit from stealth-optimal scan patterns
exposed in this work and thus could inflict certain damage that would not otherwise
be possible.
However, we do not believe this to be the case. First, as hackers must constantly
remain two steps ahead of the security community to be able to exploit the imple-
mented defenses, our results are not necessarily novel or useful to them. Second,
scanning by itself does not compromise hosts; instead, intrusion using malicious pay-
load (e.g., delivered through unsolicited packets or email) does. As a result, many
networks should remain well protected despite the findings of this chapter. Third,
botnets afford hackers such a diverse pool of IPs that they often do not care to re-
main stealthy and rely on the most basic sequential probing [3], which apparently is
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sufficient for their purposes.
This chapter should be viewed as analyzing the worst-case scenario of a Flash
worm and its coordinated delivery of new exploits from a large set of IPs. The main
challenge in defending against this kind of attack lies in the impossibility of lowering
IDS thresholds and triggering their estimators sooner. While setting the threshold
to 1 packet detects all scanners, it also raises the false-positive rate beyond the level
that typical administrators can manage [112]. Our findings therefore emphasize the
importance of deploying algorithms that provide higher accuracy, produce lower false-
positive rates, and require fewer packets. The reality of the situation, however, is that
Snort and its derivatives continue to account for an overwhelming majority of the IDS
market (contrary to what might be inferred from Table XIV, which is a limited sample
of Internet IDS). Algorithms such as Bro TRW [43] not only improve Snort by using
the IDS-B model, but also by applying a much better estimator to observed traffic.
4.9. Summary
This chapter introduced a novel formalization of scanner algorithms and IDS detec-
tion rules related to horizontal scanning. We thoroughly investigated the detection
probability of previous scan patterns and brought awareness to the existence of low-
overhead algorithms for stealth-optimal scanning, which can remain undetected at
much faster rates compared to the known approaches. We also suggested a simple,
yet effective, technique for making windows-based IDS expiration rules robust against
stealth-optimal scanners. This method is versatile and can be applied to any existing
or future implementation, regardless of the actual detection algorithm.
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CHAPTER V
SUMMARY AND FUTURE WORK
5.1. Summary
This dissertation was motivated by a need for efficient algorithms capable of per-
forming Internet-wide measurement studies using existing or inexpensive resources.
We next summarize our contributions in this area, considering each chapter of the
dissertation in turn.
5.1.1 Turbo King
Distance estimation and topological proximity in the Internet have recently emerged
as important problems for many distributed applications [1], [24], [28], [49], [72], [76],
[98], [99], [111]. Besides deploying tracers and using virtual coordinates, distance is
often estimated using end-to-end methods such as King [32] that rely on the existing
DNS infrastructure. However, the question of accuracy in such end-to-end estima-
tion and its ability to produce a large-scale map of Internet delays had never been
examined. We tackled this problem initially by showing that King produces biased
latency estimates given common DNS deployments of geographically diverse author-
itative servers and forwarders, requires significant cache pollution at remote servers,
and employs large traffic overhead for Internet-wide measurements. To overcome
these drawbacks while still using the ubiquitous DNS infrastructure, we proposed the
Turbo King latency estimation framework that obtains end-to-end samples without
suffering from the bias endured by King. Turbo King also reduces cache pollution
of remote servers by several orders of magnitude and consumes half the bandwidth
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required by King. We performed several experiments to validate our claims about
King and to demonstrate that T-King is more accurate than prior methods.
5.1.2 IRLscanner
Motivated by our need with Turbo King to discover many remote nameservers, recent
interest in the literature [10], [25], [35], [83], and the many apparent obstacles, we
next tackled the problem of performing Internet-wide service discovery measurements.
Given the design objectives of maximizing politeness at remote networks, allowing
Internet-wide scans that complete in hours on commodity hardware, and allowing
for accurate extrapolations in partial scans, we developed a novel permutation/split
algorithm and several other features that culminated in IRLscanner. To verify its
effectiveness, we used IRLscannerand 24-hour scan durations to perform 20 Internet-
wide experiments spanning ICMP, UDP (i.e., DNS, ECHO), and TCP (i.e., HTTP,
SMTP, EPMAP) and targeting both very popular ports (i.e., DNS, HTTP) and those
used by hackers and scammers (i.e., UDP ECHO, SMTP, EPMAP). In addition, we
performed the first Internet-wide OS fingerprinting of HTTP servers, presented an
alternative method for determining server uptime, and used ACK scans to stealthily
detect live hosts behind stateless firewalls. We concluded this chapter by analyzing the
various forms of feedback received during our measurements (e.g., email complaints,
IDS alarms, DNS lookups) in an effort to inform researchers interested in similar
studies.
5.1.3 Modeling Window-based IDS and Stealth Scanning
Our interest in horizontal scanning derived from working on IRLscanner and a desire
to understand its effect on remote networks led us to explore IDS, which have become
ubiquitous in the defense against virus outbreaks, malicious exploits of OS vulnerabil-
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ities, and botnet proliferation. While an IDS is often used by network administrators
to detect reconnaissance scans preceding attempted penetration, it was previously un-
known how likely an IDS was to detect a given Internet-wide scan pattern and whether
fast stealth techniques existed that could largely remain undetected at Internet-scale.
We tackled this problem first by proposing a simple analytical model for the window-
expiration rules of popular IDS tools (i.e., Snort and Bro), then used a variation of the
Chen-Stein theorem to derive their respective detection probabilities for existing scan
techniques (i.e., uniform and sequential). When finally showed through both analysis
and several Internet-wide experiments that stealth-optimal patterns exist and are ef-
fective, then proposed a simple modification to existing algorithms that proved both
highly effective and provided a more efficient use of resources under real-world traffic.
5.2. Future Work
As demonstrated by both experiments and analysis, the work presented in this disser-
tation allows for the possibility of significant additional research. We consider three
different areas of future work in turn.
5.2.1 Turbo King
Future work includes running T-King in active mode to generate the first Internet-
wide all-to-all map of distances between BGP networks, which given the Internet’s
current size would require more than 40B measurements. Given this data, it also
involves evaluating the plethora of distance estimators proposed in the literature,
eventually releasing the distance map to other researchers for their use as well. Fur-
ther, while a static map of distances would be useful, deployed applications require
updated latencies that capture the current state of the ever-changing Internet. Future
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work also includes deploying a system that provides approximate real-time estimates
of distance, then using the resulting data would to study changes in latency over time
in the Internet. This work then culminates in leveraging the knowledge gained by
analyzing current techniques and our experience with measuring latencies to create
a system that combines both theoretical approaches and actual latency estimates in
the Internet.
5.2.2 IRLscanner
Future work involves more in-depth analysis of scan data from the 20 Internet-wide
scans already performed. Further development of IRLscanner through exploring
methods for reducing B to avoid scanning unproductive networks would allow for
shorter durations, which would result in a more accurate snapshot of service avail-
ability. Future work also includes expanding RLCG/RR to provide optimal spacing
for multiple destination ports (i.e., in hybrid vertical/horizontal scanning), which
would allow us to enumerate and maintain an updated count of the number of hosts
offering every available service. Finally, based on the promise shown by our initial
OS fingerprinting, future work includes enhancing and developing new methods for
operating systems and individual service fingerprinting.
5.2.3 Modeling Window-based IDS and Stealth Scanning
Future work involves detection of combined horizontal-vertical scan patterns, which
can be used to confuse current IDS and avoid detection. It also includes develop-
ing more robust techniques for detecting distributed scans originating from multiple
source IP addresses, which is critical to making stealth-optimal scans infeasible. Fi-
nally, future work involves a deeper analysis of IDS-C, development of more advanced
techniques to thwart steal-optimal scans, and comparison of IDS RAM overhead un-
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der various types of traffic to understand the practical limitations of window sizes in
current IDS.
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